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Boxed In: Reclassification of Arab Americans on the
U.S. Census as Progress or Peril?
Khaled A. Beydoun*
The United States Bureau of the Census has proposed a standalone
“Middle Eastern or North African” (“MENA”) box for the 2020 census.
Deemed white by law since 1944, the 2020 census may afford Arab
Americans the unprecedented opportunity to identify as MENA, and
nonwhite—the latter standing as a per se designation that conflicts with
federal and local surveillance, profiling, and policing of Arab
Americans during the protracted “War on Terror.”
Since the 1980s, Arab American organizations have lobbied the
Census Bureau to recognize Arab Americans as a distinct demographic.
These efforts proved futile, until after the September 11th terrorist
attacks, when progressive steps were made toward adopting a
standalone racial box. This forward momentum intersects with
increased government interest in collecting precise and comprehensive
demographic data about Arab Americans—a population disparately
linked to terrorism.
While perceived as a moment of racial progress, the proposed 2020
Census Reform also raises many concerns. This Article investigates the
converging government interest in establishing a standalone MENA
box, and then, the perils associated with the proposed reform and
reclassification. These prospective perils include: first, expanded
government surveillance and monitoring of Arab Americans; second,
the creation of a formal binary for Arab Americans, whereby
voluntarily checking the MENA box signals association with national
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security suspicion, while checking “White” mitigates that suspicion;
and third, division of the Arab American population between two per se
races.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Arab Americans currently find themselves interlocked between
formal classification as white, and discursive recognition as nonwhite.1
The Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), the government
agency that oversees the definition, categorization, and construction of
racial categories,2 currently counts people from the Middle East and
North Africa (“MENA”) as white.3 The United States Bureau of the
Census (“Census Bureau”), the agency responsible for collecting and
compiling demographic data about the American people, adopts these
definitions and classifications for the administration of their decennial
census.4
Since the racially restrictive “Naturalization Era,”5 Arab Americans
1. “Arab Americans” are citizens of the United States that trace their ancestry back to the
“Arab World.” The “Arab World” presently encompasses nations in the Middle East and North
and East Africa where Arabic is commonly spoken. In addition to its fluid linguistic boundaries,
the “Arab World” is also a designation that refers to the twenty-three states that are members to
the Arab League. For comprehensive discussion and description of the Arab League, see Krister
Anderson, Going Major: Reforming the League of Arab States, 25 HARV. INT’L REV. 7 (2004),
which examines potential reform to the League of Arab States. For a modern history of the “Arab
World,” see generally HALIM BARAKAT, THE ARAB WORLD: SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND STATE
(1993), which notes the complexity and dynamics of the “Arab World”. For a general history of
Arab Americans, see generally RANDA A. KAYYALI, THE ARAB AMERICANS (2006), which
explains that there are approximately 270 million Arab speaking people. See also GREGORY
ORFALEA, THE ARAB AMERICANS: A HISTORY xii (2005) (noting the difficult situation facing the
Arab American community); Michael W. Suleiman, Introduction: The Arab Immigrant
Experience, in ARABS IN AMERICA: BUILDING A NEW FUTURE 1 (Michael W. Suleiman ed.,
1999) (describing the two major waves of Arab immigration to the United States).
2. The OMB and the Census Bureau are the principal actors that “construct” per se definitions
of race and racial categories. The administrative making of race illustrates how “[r]aces are not
biologically differentiated groupings but rather social constructions.” IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xiii (1996). The legal meaning of race,
and indeed racial categories, fluidly shifts in line with political, economic, and social stimuli.
This dynamic, in turn, makes racial categories—and the entire enterprise of administrative racemaking—a dynamic, sometimes volatile, and perpetually sensitive process. See RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (2001) (“[R]ace
and races are products of social thought and relations. Not objective, inherent, or fixed, they
correspond to no biological or genetic reality; rather, races are categories that society invents,
manipulates, or retires when convenient.”).
3. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race & Ethnicity, OFF.
MGMT. & BUDGET (Oct. 30, 1997), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_1997standards.
4. About Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.
html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). The U.S. Constitution mandates that the census is administered
every ten years. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
5. The “Naturalization Era,” the period of time in which the Naturalization Act was in place,
lasted from 1790 to 1952. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (“An Act to
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”), repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 [hereinafter Naturalization Act of 1790] (“[A]ny alien,
being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of
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have been legally classified as, and conflated with, whites—a per se
designation misaligned with societal reading, recognition, and
racialization of Arab American identity.6 Arab Americans are part of
the broader MENA milieu. Therefore, the proposed MENA box will
formally shift the racial classification of Arab Americans from white to
nonwhite.
Within the context of the pronounced and protracted “War on
Terror,”7 the OMB and the Census Bureau may be the only two
government entities that still identify Arab Americans as white.
Heightening state surveillance of Arab Americans, combined with rising
societal animus,8 manifest a shared public and private view of the
population as not only nonwhites, but also others,9 “terrorists”10 or
“terrorist sympathizers,”11 “fundamentalists,”12 and “radicals.”13

the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on
application to any common law court of record, in any one of the states wherein he shall have
resided for the term of one year at least.”).
6. Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab
American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29, 33 (2013).
7. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006) (holding that military tribunals created
by the Bush administration violated the law); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509
(2004) (holding that a U.S. citizen held as an “enemy combatant” held a right to a hearing to
challenge that designation). See generally Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004)
(highlighting policies adopted by the Bush administration during the “War on Terror”). These
cases, along with the sweeping legislation and reforms that followed 9/11, initiated the
international and domestic war against terrorism, hereinafter referred to in this Article as the
“War on Terror.” Id.
8. JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICA’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY 3
(2009) (“Unlike many other racial minorities in our country, Middle Eastern Americans have
faced rising, rather than diminishing, degrees of discrimination over time—a fact highlighted by
recent targeted immigration policies, racial profiling, a war on terrorism with a decided racialist
bent, and growing rates of job discrimination and hate crime.”).
9. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as
Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV 1259, 1264 (2004) (discussing increased racial violence
following September 11).
10. See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295,
300 (2002) (“Most Americans probably feel particularly threatened because the September 11
suicide hijackers were foreign, and some may be especially fearful because they were Arabs.
This fear may cause us to exaggerate the danger of future attacks in general, and of attacks by
Middle Eastern terrorists in particular. As a result, we may overestimate the effect of racially
specific security measures. And unfortunately, we are more willing to accept aggressive
measures when they target small and politically disempowered groups, specifically racial and
ethnic minorities, and foreign nationals.”).
11. ARAB DETROIT 9/11: LIFE IN THE TERROR DECADE 11 (Nabeel Abraham, Sally Howell &
Andrew Shyrock eds., 2011).
12. See John Tehranian, Selective Racialization: Middle-Eastern American Identity and the
Faustian Pact with Whiteness, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2008) (discussing the effects of
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Although not a new phenomenon, the association of Arab American
identity with subversion, warmongering, and terrorism intensified after
the September 11th terrorist attacks.14 Fifteen years later, the
broadening of anti-terror policing coupled with emergent “preventative
counterterrorism” capabilities, or “Countering Violent Extremism”
(“CVE”) policing,15 signal that suspicion of Arab American identity is
still trending upward, and perhaps, yet to reach its apex.
Converging with this impasse of swelling state and societal suspicion
is the Census Bureau’s proposed reform and reclassification of Arab
American identity. The anticipated adoption of a standalone MENA
box on the 2020 census would afford Arab Americans, and other
citizens with ties to the “MENA region,”16 with a long-coveted racial
(or ethnic) classification that acknowledges their distinct cultures,
ancestries, and places of origin.17 If adopted, the MENA box would
mark the first time the OMB and the Census Bureau recognize Arab
Americans, and other groups of citizens from the MENA region, as a
distinct racial group.18
Until 1944, the courts treated Arab identity and whiteness as legally
irreconcilable.19 While whiteness was built into the per se definition of
Middle-Eastern Americans developing “a Faustian pact with whiteness”); see also Amna Akbar
& Rupal Oza, ‘Muslim Fundamentalism’ and Human Rights in the Age of Terror and Empire, in
GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
152, 165 (Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013) (examining the good versus
bad Muslim binary, which pegs the latter “fundamentalists” and thus having a propensity for
terrorism).
13. Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 814 (2013).
14. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); see also
Amaney Jamal, Civil Liberties and the Otherization of Arab and Muslim Americans, in RACE
AND ARAB AMERICANS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11: FROM INVISIBLE CITIZENS TO VISIBLE
SUBJECTS 114, 117–18 (Amaney Jamal & Nadine Naber eds., 2008).
15. Akbar, supra note 13, at 811, 850; Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The
Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 127 (2012) (“[C]ounterradicalization conforms to the preemptive logic of counterterrorism, which focuses on strategies
that minimize the risk and intensity of future terrorist attacks.”).
16. This Article will refer to the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) as a single region,
aligning with prevailing administrative and political baselines, though the lands encompassed by
MENA are anything but homogenous along ethnic, racial, religious, or political lines.
17. 2015 National Content Test Operations Update: Preparations for the 2020 Census, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/presskits/2014/20141006_2020opbrief_slides.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Census Update].
18. Qualifying as a per se minority group, or a “disadvantaged minority” group, may require
additional steps following (prospective) adoption of the proposed MENA classification.
19. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 34.
1) Presiding judges conflated Arab identity with Muslim identity; 2) A rule that Arab
Muslims were per se non-white and therefore ineligible for citizenship was in place
until 1944, only eight years before the end of the Naturalization Era; 3) Presiding
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citizenship until 1952,20 and immigrants from the MENA region
litigated their racial bona fides as concomitant with whiteness, the
courts repeatedly associated their region of origin as antithetical to
American identity.21 For 154 years, during the Naturalization Era,
which mandated whiteness as a prerequisite for citizenship, shedding
one’s Arab identity was the lone portal toward whiteness for
immigrants.22 The proposed MENA classification, if adopted, will
formally reintroduce this binary back into American law, codified into
the U.S. census racial framework during a sociopolitical impasse when
Arab American bodies, households, and communities are closely
scrutinized by federal and local law enforcement.23
“Why now?” is a question surrounding the timing of the proposed
reform. Arab Americans have lobbied for a distinct racial, or ancestral,
classification since the 1980s.24 Deemed “one of the grand prizes in the
politics of identity,” Arab American communities, organizations, and
stakeholders have long strove for the existential, political, legal, and
economic benefits that a standalone box on the U.S. census form
promises.25 However, previous reform and reclassification efforts were
met with denial and repeated reaffirmation of the administrative
position that Arab Americans were white. These earlier attempts at
reform indicate that, during this period, government interest in
maintaining Arab Americans as “white by law” conflicted with
judges presumed that immigrant petitioners from the Arab World (whether Christian or
Muslim) were Muslims and thus non-white, as consequence of the conflation; and 4)
This presumption could only be overcome if the immigrant-petitioner could persuade
the presiding judge that he was a bona fide Christian.
Id. Furthermore, it is my position that judges who found Syrians white by law in earlier
decisions, especially Dow v. United States, believed that Syrian Christians were not Arabs—
again, because of this conflation of Arab with Muslim identity. Dow v. United States, 226 F. 145
(4th Cir. 1915).
20. The Act of July 14, 1870, which followed the abolition of slavery, extended naturalization
eligibility to “aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” Act of July 14, 1870,
ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (“An Act to amend the Naturalization Laws and to punish Crime
against the same, and for other Purposes”).
21. “Political propaganda that maligned the Arab Muslim Orient branded immigrants from
this sphere as hostile to American ideals and society, and thus inassimilable.” Beydoun, supra
note 6, at 46.
22. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103.
23. Census law scholar Naomi Mezey frames this binary as “the average person,” an axis
synonymous with whiteness; and “its corollary, the deviant,” a classification that aligns with
prevailing perceptions of Arab and MENA identity. Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition:
The Census, Race and the National Imagination, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1701, 1715 (2003).
24. Randa Kayyali, US Census Classifications and Arab Americans: Contestations and
Definitions of Identity Markers, 39 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1299, 1305–06 (2013).
25. Mezey, supra note 23, at 1748.
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community efforts for reform and reclassification.26
However, closer cooperation between Arab American stakeholders
and the Census Bureau in recent years signals a prospective “interest
convergence” between once misaligned community and government
aims.27 Beginning in 2013, renewed discussions between the Census
Bureau and Arab American groups gained considerable momentum, and
materialized into tentative acceptance and ongoing testing of the
standalone MENA category.28 This momentum reflects shifting state
interests that point toward the likely adoption of the MENA box on the
2020 U.S. census form.29 Uncovering these interests is a principal aim
of this Article.
Momentum toward Arab American racial reform and reclassification
intersects with expansion of the state’s anti-terrorism surveillance,
prevention,30 and policing capacities.
During the Obama
Administration, suspicion of Arab, MENA, and Muslim Americans—
communities that often but not always overlap—enhanced.31 National
Security Administration (“NSA”) surveillance powers were carried
forward,32 and pilot CVE programs extending federal policing tools to
local law enforcement were launched in Boston, Minneapolis, and Los
Angeles in 2014—to be followed by additional cities in the coming
years.33 The Suspicious Activity Reporting (“SAR”)34 and CVE
26. See generally Beydoun, supra note 6 (examining the Naturalization Era of Arabs
Americans, which required “whiteness” for citizenship).
27. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980). Bell’s interest-convergence theory
holds that discrete state political or economic interests oftentimes spur domestic civil rights
progress. Therefore, civil rights progress is more a means toward advancing these ends, instead
of an end in and of itself.
28. Testing and discussion about the structure, language, and scope of the proposed MENA
category was still very fluid at the time of drafting this Article.
29. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Census Bureau Explores New Middle East/North Africa Ethnic
Category, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/24/
census-bureau-explores-new-middle-eastnorth-africa-ethnic-category/.
30. See Akbar, supra note 13, at 810 (“The preventative framework—where the government
aims to prevent future terrorism—now defines counterterrorism programs at home and abroad.”).
31. More specifically, the counter-terrorism prevention models, ushered in by the counterradicalization programming discussed in Parts III.B and C of this Article, were solidified under
the Obama administration.
32. Shayana Kadidal, NSA Surveillance: The Implications for Civil Liberties, 10 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 433, 434 (2014).
33. Akbar, supra note 13, at 845–68 (examining closely the new radicalization policing tactics
used by federal and local law enforcement). Counter-radicalization parlance and policing is
almost exclusively focused on Muslim communities, which sometimes overlap and are frequently
conflated with Arab American communities. “Radicalization suggests that the path from Muslim
to terrorist is a predictable one produced by or correlated with religious and political cultures of
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programs not only supplement NSA surveillance, but also expand the
national security policing paradigm from a centralized model steered by
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), to a community law
enforcement-based approach.35
The MENA box, if adopted, would enable the collection and
compilation of precise and broader demographical data about Arab
Americans—communities acutely associated with radicalization and
terrorism. If availed to DHS and local law enforcement, this data would
intensify and expand the functional reach of anti-terror surveillance and
policing, and in turn, further erode the civil liberties of Arab Americans.
Therefore, the timing of the proposed MENA box signals that the
state’s pressing national security interests—instead of Arab American
and MENA organizational and grassroots efforts—may be the principal
catalyst facilitating the anticipated adoption of the MENA box on the
2020 U.S. census.36 Rather than adopting the MENA box as a means
toward neutral demographic data collection, the proposed classification
equips the state with the operational means to collect and compile more
specific and comprehensive information about a community disparately
linked with national security threats, terrorism, and in line with
Muslim communities. Government radicalization discourses and programs are almost entirely
fixated on Islam and Muslims . . . .” Id. at 811; see also Shelley Murphy, Boston to Host AntiExtremist Pilot Program, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/
2014/09/23/boston-site-program-prevent-residents-from-joining-extremist-groups/YpEpq2cYvIT
Z6u8AFkbarL/story.html (discussing pilot programs started by the Justice Department aimed at
deterring citizens from joining violent extremist groups).
34. The Nationwide SAR Initiative, NSI, http://nsi.ncirc.gov/?AspxAutoDetectCookie
Support=1 (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) is a joint
collaborative effort by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners. This
initiative provides law enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism and
other related criminal activity by establishing a national capacity for gathering,
documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing SAR information.
Id.
35. The post-9/11 collaboration by the FBI, Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and New York
Police Department (“NYPD”) focusing on preventing terrorism spearheaded the new surveillance
and policing model. COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM
WHITE PAPER 11 (2006), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.white
paper.pdf. The NYPD’s Intelligence Division published a 2007 report, widely considered the
most comprehensive report on CVE published by a police department. MITCHELL D. SILBER &
ARVIN BHATT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN
THREAT (2007), http://nypdshield.org/public/sitefiles/documents/nypd_report-radicalization_in_
the_west.pdf.
36. See generally Manav Bhatnagar, Note, Identifying the Identified: The Census, Race, and
the Myth of Self-Classification, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 85 (2007) (arguing that the role of the
census in racial data collection is far from neutral, and driven by specific policy goals).
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emergent nationals security parlance, “radicalization.”
First, this Article argues that the state’s interest in obtaining more
accurate “macro and micro demographic data” about Arab Americans is
a primary factor driving the prospective adoption of the MENA box for
the 2020 census.37 The proposed MENA box in general, and the
“darker side” of the possible reform and reclassification of Arab
American identity debate specifically, are yet to be examined within
legal scholarship. By illuminating the causal state interests facilitating
reform and reclassification, this Article analyzes how more precise and
extensive demographic data—collected and compiled with a MENA
box in the U.S. census form—expands the reach of the federal and local
anti-terror and counter-radicalization policing.38
Second, this Article analyzes the prospective perils that reform and
reclassification of the current U.S. census framework pose to Arab
Americans. While a host of existential, political, legal, and economic
interests drive majority support for the MENA classification within the
Arab American community, these anticipated benefits mask the
imminent perils associated with the box, as analyzed within scholarly
and advocacy discourses. The proposed MENA classification, if
implemented would:
(1) Broaden the functional reach of government surveillance
and policing of an already “vulnerable population,”39 further
eroding the state of Arab American civil liberties. This
danger is all the more acute, given the shift from centralized
anti-terror policing to local law enforcement models;
(2) Formally reinstitute a per se binary whereby checking the
“MENA” box signals perceived association with a group
linked to national security threats, while checking “White”
mitigates that suspicion; and finally,
(3) Divide the Arab American population between two per se
races.

37. See William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, The Dark Side of Numbers: The Role of
Population Data Systems in Human Rights Abuses, 68 SOC. RES. 481 (2001) (illustrating how
demographic data collected by U.S. census was used to monitor and round up groups associated
with national security threat).
38. Id. at 485.
39. Seltzer and Anderson define “vulnerable person(s)” as a “potentially censurable or
vulnerable entity.” Id. at 483. Census data is collected, in part, to target an entity made
vulnerable as a result of its association with a national security threat or a presumed propensity
for subversion—as is the case with Arab, MENA, and Muslim Americans today.
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Therefore, while broadly perceived as a moment of racial progress,
per se recognition of MENA identity must be examined within today’s
context of rising state suspicion, broadening surveillance, and emerging
CVE programming.40 Upon closer inspection, the degree of progress
spurred by the MENA box may be mitigated by the prospective perils
posed by it. In short, the MENA classification appears to be a
progressive step forward with regard to acknowledging the unique racial
identity of Arab American, but simultaneously,41 a step backward with
regard to bolstering the community surveillance, profiling, and policing
front—particularly with the establishment and expansion of CVE
policing.
The ramifications of this proposed reform are immense. As
evidenced by the wellspring of scholarship on Arab, MENA, and
Muslim American populations since 9/11, the creation of a MENA
classification stands to have an acute impact on the legal literature
linked to national security and anti-terrorism policing, immigration law,
and civil rights—in addition to a host of distinct and corollary
discourses centering on Arab, MENA, and Muslim American
populations. Dovetailing off the research in these areas, this Article is
the first to examine the proposed MENA box for the 2020 census and
the forecasted impact it stands to have on Arab Americans. In addition,
this Article contributes to the rising legal literature on CVE policing—
which succeeds the USA PATRIOT Act42 as the new surveillance
program disproportionately targeting Arab, MENA, and Muslim
Americans.
Part II outlines the present classification of Arab Americans by the
OMB and the Census Bureau, followed by an analysis of the proposed
MENA classification.
Part III investigates the timing of the proposed reform, uncovering
how converging community and state interests influence the Census
Bureau’s unprecedented support of a standalone MENA box.
Part IV examines the government’s three principal national security

40. Khaled A. Beydoun, Boxed In or Out? The Proposed Middle-Eastern American Box to
the 2020 US Census, RACE & L. PROF. BLOG (Mar. 27, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
racelawprof/2015/03/boxed-in-or-out-the-proposed-middle-eastern-american-box-to-the-2020-uscensus.html.
41. See generally Mezey, supra note 23 (discussing how census classifications have affected
conceptions of race).
42. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
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and anti-terror policing programs, highlighting the shift from federal
anti-terrorism policing to a renewed model fusing centralized DHS
capabilities with local law enforcement programming (CVE and SAR).
Part V identifies how adoption of the MENA classification will lead
to the collection and compilation of more accurate and extensive
demographic data about Arab Americans. This may, in turn, facilitate
more intrusive federal national security law enforcement and local
counter-radicalization policing, a development that stands to increase
the vulnerability of Arab Americans during the War on Terror.
II. RACIAL MISALIGNMENT
Arab Americans have overwhelmingly argued that their per se racial
status conflicts with their lived experience.43 I dub this circumstance
“racial misalignment,” which is a status characterized by a marked
discrepancy between a population’s “social citizenship”44 and the racial
classification ascribed to it by law.45
This Article analyzes this concept through the mismatched
classification of Arab American identity, which the OMB and the
Census Bureau define as white, but which federal and local law
enforcement reads, recognizes, and racializes as pariah.46 This
misalignment underlies the decades-long quest by Arab Americans to
claim a per se designation that acknowledges the distinct parameters of
their identity,47 and simultaneously reflects their “second class
citizenship” in the United States today.48
The reform proposed by the Census Bureau for the 2020 census, from
43. See Carla Murphy, Arab-Americans Tell Census, ‘We’re Not White,’ COLORLINES (July 3,
2014, 10:08 AM), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/arab-americans-tell-census-were-not-white
(giving a recent account documenting personal testimonies from Arab Americans).
44. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 30–31 (2006) (“[T]here is often a gap between possession of [formal] citizenship
status and the enjoyment or performance of citizenship in substantive terms.”).
45. A forthcoming article, titled “Racial Misalignment,” will closely investigate the legal
implications of this circumstance. Racial misalignment as a concept can be extended to
illuminate, and subsequently investigate, the dissonance between the formal classification and
social citizenship of another similarly situated population or community.
46. “On one hand, [Arab Americans] suffer from the types of discrimination that face minority
groups. On the other hand, formally speaking, Middle Easterners [and thus, Arab Americans] are
deemed white by law.” Tehranian, supra note 12, at 1204.
47. See generally Kayyali, supra note 24.
48. BOSNIAK, supra note 44, at 30. “[C]ertain marginalized social groups may now enjoy
nominal citizenship status, but their members are, in fact, afforded less in the way of substantive
citizenship than others in society, either because they suffer directly unequal treatment . . . or
because the legal system treats certain social domains where de facto inequality prevails . . . as
falling beyond the constraints of citizenship altogether.” Id.
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an administrative perspective, would resolve Arab American racial
misalignment.49 Adoption of the contemplated MENA box would, for
purposes of per se racial classification,50 realign how Arab Americans
are identified on the books with how they are profiled and policed on
the ground. Section A analyzes the OMB’s and the Census Bureau’s
current per se designation of Arab Americans. Section B examines the
conceptual and structural character of the MENA box proposed for the
2020 U.S. census.
A. Arab Americans Are White?
For Arab Americans, racial misalignment may mark the essence of
their experience since arriving on American soil. This existential
position has a double effect: intensifying the sense of being “out of
place” in America,51 and the concomitant longing for the homeland.
Balady52 is a standalone term frequently invoked by Arab Americans to
describe a longing for more than mere place of residence, or for the
rights and privileges attached to formal “citizenship.”53 Further, the
word signifies a metaphysical “attachment to some group, its culture or
language, or perhaps its historical experience,” that newcomers aspire
for after landing on American soil.54

49. Bhatnagar addresses this racial misalignment in the form of no “Middle Eastern” or
“Arab” box on the census, stating, “[p]erhaps the most notable exclusion is a category for
individuals of Middle Eastern or Arab descent, who are predominantly classified as ‘white’—
though many commentators have suggested that the effects of 9/11 may lead to a separate
category being added in the future.” Bhatnagar, supra note 36, at 102.
50. The U.S. Census Bureau refers to the OMB per se designations as “administrative race”
designations. The Census Bureau’s designations are also referred to as “statistical races,” or
“tools of government, with political purposes and policy consequences,” distinguished from the
eugenicist and common perception standards the courts ceded to in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. KENNETH PREWITT, WHAT IS YOUR RACE? THE CENSUS AND OUR FLAWED
EFFORTS TO CLASSIFY AMERICANS 4 (2013).
51. Here I am referring to the phrase coined by Edward Said, who described his sense of being
perpetually “out of place” (as a Palestinian Christian in Palestine, and a Palestinian American in
the United States), as a combined status of isolation and marginalization. See generally EDWARD
SAID, OUT OF PLACE: A MEMOIR (1999) (discussing growing up with a sense of divided identity).
52. “My country” (Arabic).
53. BOSNIAK, supra note 44, at 1.
The idea of citizenship is commonly invoked to convey a state of democratic belonging
or inclusion, yet this inclusion is usually premised on a conception of a community that
is bounded and exclusive. Citizenship as an ideal is understood to embody a
commitment against subordination, but citizenship can also represent an axis of
subordination itself.
Id.
54. PETER SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS? RACE, GROUP IDENTITY, AND THE EVASION
OF POLITICS 43 (2000).
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Since the first immigrants from the Arab World passed through Ellis
Island in the nineteenth century55 until the present day, the law has
consistently drawn a sharp line between Arab and American identity.
Like groups of immigrants that arrived before and after them, Arab
newcomers seeking to become citizens maneuvered within a formal
racial order that failed to carve out a specific place for them.56 As a
result, Arabs were pushed to the racial margins in search of a per se
classification that fit their identity, captured their narrative, and spoke to
their distinct experience in their new balady—the United States.
This racial quandary, or misalignment, would be legally adjusted
with the adoption of the MENA box. Unsurprisingly, in the face of
racially restrictive immigration and naturalization laws, 57 coupled with
the aforementioned longstanding statutory regime that “cause[s]
confusion” and poses existential, political, legal, and economic
dilemmas,58 Arab Americans are generally supportive of the proposed
MENA box.59
Through legislation, judicial rulings, and government agency
directives,60 the law’s making and remaking of Arab American identity
highlights the turbulence of the American race-making enterprise.61
Indeed, the racial paradox that riddles Arab Americans today not only
illustrates this turbulence, but also exposes the absurdity of designating
55. ORFALEA, supra note 1, at 5.
56. See generally LÓPEZ, supra note 2 (discussing racialization and the white identity).
57. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103.
58. The 2010 Census Communication Contract: The Media Plan in Hard to Count Areas:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census & Nat’l Archives of the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 356 (2010) (statement of Helen H. Samhan, Executive
Director, Arab American Institute Foundation) [hereinafter “Samhan Testimony”] (highlighting
how the prevailing designation of Arab Americans as white has “caused confusion, alienation and
even anger within segments of the American population with origins in the MENA region”).
59. Although no formal survey measuring this support has been conducted, support for the
MENA box is duly reflected by organizational reform for the classification. The most prominent
Arab American organizations, including the Arab American Institute (“AAI”), the American Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee (“ADC”), and Arab Center for Cultural, Economic and Social
Services (“ACCESS”)—the largest Arab American social services organization in the country—
strongly support adoption of the MENA box. However, as I will discuss more closely later in this
Article, some segments of the broader Arab American population prefer being identified as white,
and presumably, will continue to identify as such if the MENA box is adopted in 2020.
60. The OMB, being the agency that oversees race and racial categories, “has the power to
limit, expand, and define the field of racial categories.” Bhatnagar, supra note 36, at 100. This
power illustrates the OMB’s considerable influence in constructing and defining racial categories,
which government agencies are mandated to follow.
61. The fluid making and remaking of Arab American racial identity highlights the Critical
Race Theory baseline that race is “socially constructed.” MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 68 (2d ed. 1994).
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Arab Americans as white. Particularly within the context of the War on
Terror, whereby state and societal actors continue to perceive Arab
Americans with suspicion, and in the extreme, as presumptive terrorists.
1. Legally White
The OMB’s designation of Arab Americans as white by law is rooted
in early- to mid-twentieth-century immigration and naturalization
jurisprudence.62 During the racially restrictive Naturalization Era, Arab
immigrants—like immigrants from other parts of the world—
”performed whiteness” during civil proceedings as a means toward
gaining citizenship.63 Nearly 110 years after the first Arab immigrant
came before a judge seeking citizenship,64 Arab Americans still find
themselves interlocked between an existential and legal paradox: per
se classification as white, but pervasive profiling and policing as
pariah.65
Two key naturalization decisions, Dow v. United States in 191566 and
Ex Parte Mohriez in 1944,67 which extended per se whiteness to Syrian
Christians and Arab Muslims, respectively,68 together established the
modern designation of Arab Americans as white by law. The latter

62. Beydoun, supra note 6.
63. See generally John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the
Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817 (2000) (examining closely how
immigrant-petitioners negotiated their native identities in ways that conformed with whiteness
before judges; a mandate for citizenship before 1952); Beydoun, supra note 6, at 49–60
(examining the white identity); LÓPEZ, supra note 2, at 15 (same).
64. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 31–33. In 1909, “Judge George H. Hutton peered across his
bench in the direction of George Shishim. Shishim, a longtime resident of California and native
of the Mount Lebanon Province of the Ottoman Empire, had entered Hutton’s court to petition for
American citizenship.” Id. at 31.
65. Being burdened by an identity paradox spawned by law, looking back and ahead, may
very well be the definitive marker of the grand Arab American narrative. To be Arab American
is to be confined within the never-ending crucible of racial catch-22s, whereby assigned legal
status is either misaligned with social citizenship; or, if the proposed MENA category is adopted,
positions Arab Americans squarely within the paradox of civil rights progress and enhanced
vulnerability.
66. Dow v. United States, 226 F. 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1915). George Dow was a Syrian
Christian immigrant, who was denied naturalization by two lower courts before successfully
appealing to the Fourth Circuit.
67. Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941, 942 (D. Mass. 1944). The court found a Muslim from
Saudi Arabia to be within the statutory definition of whiteness. Id. The decision was driven by
interest to promote, “friendlier relations between the United States and other nations.” Beydoun,
supra note 6, at 70.
68. See generally SARAH M. A. GUALTIERI, BETWEEN ARAB AND WHITE: RACE AND
ETHNICITY IN THE EARLY SYRIAN AMERICAN DIASPORA (2009) (giving a history of the
experience of the early waves of Syrian immigrants).
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decision formally acknowledged “Arabs” as a distinct identity from
Syrians, and, thus, as white by law. The Dow decision was narrow,
delivering whiteness to Syrian Christians specifically. Because Arab
was conflated with Muslim identity, Arab Muslim petitioners were
deemed nonwhite for the twenty-nine years between Dow and Mohriez.
While largely forgotten as a dark chapter of American immigration
and naturalization history, the legacy of the Naturalization Era
continues to color the per se racial status of Arab Americans today.69 In
1978, the OMB codified the rulings handed down in Dow and Mohriez
with Statistical Directive No. 15 (“Directive No. 15”), which designated
people from the MENA region as white.70 One commentator called
Directive No. 15 “the single event most responsible for the lines” that
configure our understanding of race.71 Twenty years later, the 1997
OMB directives on race and ethnicity reaffirmed that “person[s] having
origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East or
North Africa” were white by law.72
The Census Bureau, mandated to follow the racial definitions and
categories delineated by the OMB,73 counts Arab Americans—and all
persons hailing from the MENA region—as white.74 Therefore, the
decisions handed down one-hundred-one and seventy-two years ago in
Dow and Mohriez respectively, are still good law, seeding the per se
baseline for the modern designation of Arab Americans as white.75 In
turn, these cases offer a compelling rebuttal to the notion that the
Naturalization Act of 1790, not Directive 15, still stands as the “most
responsible [event] . . . that configure[s] our” misunderstanding of Arab

69. Prewitt critiques prevailing conceptions of race as being based on arcane race thinking:
“Twenty-first century statistics should not be governed by race thinking that is two and a half
centuries out of date.” PREWITT, supra note 50, at 3.
70. Statistical Directive No. 15: Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and
Administrative Reporting, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,269–70 (May 6, 1978).
71. Mezey, supra note 23, at 1746 (quoting DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA:
BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 33 (rev. ed. 2000)).
72. Id. at 1763–64.
73. “The U.S Census Bureau must adhere to the 1997 Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) standards on race and ethnicity.” About Race, supra note 4.
74. Helen Hatab Samhan, Not Quite White: Race Classification and the Arab-American
Experience, in ARABS IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 209, 214. “The categories promulgated in
1978 by the OMB did draw distinctions but, unlike earlier policies, not on the basis of skin color.
Known as ‘Directive 15,’ the standards identify four race categories.” The OMB defined white as
including “persons originating in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.” Id.
75. See generally Beydoun, supra note 6 (analyzing the development of the Arab American
identity).

15_BEYDOUN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

708

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

3/31/2016 5:57 PM

[Vol. 47

American identity.76 The judicial pronouncements that Arabs were
white by law were subsequently adopted by other government agencies,
which universally established this formal designation within the
executive and legislative branches.
The racial classification of Arab Americans as white has considerable
practical ramifications. Because Arab Americans are still designated as
white, statistical data about the population is “of very dubious quality
and lacks consistency.”77 The OMB’s definition of Arab Americans as
white has led to an undercounting of their real, numerical presence in
the United States.78
This undercounting is illustrated by the
considerable gap between official U.S. Census Bureau figures and
private pollsters. The Census Bureau currently estimates that the Arab
American population is 1.5 million;79 a figure regarded to be far smaller
than the actual number.80 However, the Arab American Institute’s
(“AAI”) internal polling estimates the population of Arab Americans at
3,665,789, more than two times the size of the Census Bureau figures.81
Hassan Jaber, Executive Director of the Arab Community Center for
Economic and Social Services (“ACCESS”)—the premier Arab
American social services organization in the United States—estimates
that the “true number might be closer to almost 6 million.”82
Rising immigration from the MENA region, particularly from wartorn and turbulent states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, is steadily
increasing the Arab population in the United States.83 Since 2000, the

76. Mezey, supra note 23, at 1746.
77. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1300.
78. The AAI estimates that the per se designation of white has led to a 60% undercounting of
Arab Americans. ARAB AM. INST., DEMOGRAPHICS (2012), http://b.3cdn.net/aai/44b17815d
8b386bf16_v0m6iv4b5.pdf [hereinafter AAI DEMOGRAPHICS].
79. MARYAM ASI & DANIEL BEAULIEU, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ARAB HOUSEHOLDS IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2006-2010, at 1 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr10-20.pdf.
The Arab Households Survey estimates that, as of 2010, the United States was home to 500,000
Arab American households. Id. at 2.
80. “The number of Arab households has also grown over time, increasing from 268,000 in
1990 to 427,000 in 2000. Data from the 2006-2010 [American Community Survey] 5-year
estimates reveal that there were 511,000 Arab households in the United States, representing a
91.0 percent increase since 1990.” Id. at 1.
81. “The population who identified as having Arabic-speaking ancestry in the U.S. Census
grew by more than 72% between 2000 and 2010.” AAI DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 78.
82. Haya El Nasser, Arabs, Hispanics Seeking Better US Census Recognition, AL JAZEERA
AM. (Dec. 17, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/17/arabs-hispanicsseekingbetteruscensusrecognition.html.
83. KAYYALI, supra note 1, at 98–100; see also AAI DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 78 (“The
population who identified as having Arabic-speaking ancestry in the U.S. Census grew by more
than 72% between 2000 and 2010.”).
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Arab American population has increased roughly 47%, and at an even
higher rate in the five most concentrated markets: the Detroit-Dearborn
area, Los Angeles, New York-New Jersey, Chicago, and Washington,
D.C.84 While undercounting has detrimental effects on the Arab
American population, which I will discuss in Part II, accurate
demographic data is also a matter of rising concern—and interest—for
federal and local law enforcement during today’s ongoing War on
Terror.
2. De Facto Pariahs
“Arab Americans are white?” This question, posed more as a
demonstration of shock or surprise, highlights the cognitive dissonance
between how Arab American identity and whiteness are discursively
imagined and understood.85 This dissonance is hardly aberrational, but
reflective of a pervasive sociopolitical framing that makes Arab
“synonymous” with Muslim.86
Subsequently, these frequently
conflated identities are routinely characterized as “alien,”87
“inassimilable,”88 and “subversive.”89 More blatantly, the War on
Terror has led to policing of Arab Americans as proxies or members of
84. Heather Brown, Emily Guskin & Amy Mitchell, Arab-American Population Growth, PEW
RES. CTR. 1–2 (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/arabamerican-populationgrowth; see also ARAB AM. INST., MICHIGAN: STATE’S RANK BY ARAB AMERICAN POPULATION
(2011), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aai/pages/7706/attachments/original/1431630798/
Michigan.pdf?1431630798 (providing statistics about the Arab American population in
Michigan, recognized as the hub of the Arab American population).
85. This dissonance was vividly revealed, on a national platform, during the 2008 presidential
campaign. During a campaign town hall in Lakeville, Minnesota, an attendee referred to (then
Democratic candidate) Barack Obama “as an Arab.” McCain responded, “No . . . [he’s a] decent
person and a person you don’t have to be scared of as president of the United States.” Jonathan
Martin & Amie Parnes, McCain: Obama Not an Arab, Crowd Boos, POLITICO (Oct. 10, 2008,
9:19
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2008/10/mccain-obama-not-an-arab-crowd-boos014479. In short, such sentiments conflate Arab identity with indecency and menace.
86. Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis,
Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 722 (2003) (“The panethnicity term ‘Arab’ and the religious signifier ‘Muslim’ have been socially constructed as a
synonymous ‘race’ in the United States.”).
87. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 32.
88. Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on
Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 75 (2004) (analyzing how Arab and MENA noncitizens and
citizens are incapable of assimilation); see also Volpp, supra note 14, at 1594 (arguing that
although Arab Americans are citizens and “theoretically entitled to formal rights . . . they do not
stand in for or represent the nation. Instead, they are interpellated as antithetical to the citizen’s
sense of identity.”).
89. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 30; see also Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins of Muslim
Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 121, 125 (2008) (describing the
effects of the war on terror with the racialization of Muslims).
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an “enemy race.”90
These caricatures, deployed regularly by
politicians, pundits, and popular media,91 render Arab Americans de
facto nonwhites.
However, amidst popular representations and
particularly the still escalating War on Terror, Arab Americans remain
saddled with a conflicting legal designation that veers markedly from
their lived experience.92
From 1944 to 2015, the law has counted Arab Americans as white.93
This classification clashes with earlier conceptions of Arab identity as
inassimilable on grounds of eugenics,94 phenotype,95 religion,96 and
having origins in the “Mohammedan World”97—a constructed sphere

90. Tehranian, supra note 12, at 1216.
91. See generally JACK G. SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A
PEOPLE (2001) (for a comprehensive history of cinematic and television misrepresentations of
Arab, MENA, and Muslim identity); JACK G. SHAHEEN, THE TV ARAB (1984) (providing a
foundational account of television misrepresentations of Arab and Arab Americans through the
early 1980s); TIM JON SEMMERLING, “EVIL” ARABS IN AMERICAN POPULAR FILM: ORIENTALIST
FEAR (2006) (providing a more recent accounting of caricatured portrayals of Arab characters in
American cinema).
92. This is not to imply that there is a monolithic Arab American “lived experience.” As
discussed in Part IV of the Article, segments of the Arab American milieu prefer the status quo,
and may choose to maintain their per se status as white if the proposed reform is adopted.
However, a common thread shared by Arab Americans is the conflation of Arab identity with
terrorism, which is experienced disparately but nevertheless encountered by the overwhelming
majority of the population.
93. Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1944) extended the ruling that Arab Muslims
where white by law. An earlier decision, Dow v. United States, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915),
affirmed that Syrian Christians were white twenty-nine years earlier.
[A]lthough Mohriez set the precedent that a Muslim immigrant from the Arab World
fit within the statutory decision of whiteness, the decision did not retroactively
recognize naturalized Syrian Christians as Arabs, or formally acknowledge them as
Arab Americans. The courts still viewed both as separate racial groups, bringing about
a segregated view of Arab American identity that clashed with the gradually
galvanizing mode of Arab identity brought forth by Pan-Arabism.
Beydoun, supra note 6, at 66.
94. Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 813 (E.D.S.C. 1913); Ex parte Dow, 211 F. 486 (E.D.S.C.
1914); In re Dow, 213 F. 355 (E.D.S.C. 1914).
95. Shahid, 205 F. at 814.
96. See generally Beydoun, supra note 6, at 29–30 (noting that courts, until 1944, found that
Islam was irreconcilable with whiteness, and although a religion, a racial proxy for
nonwhiteness).
97. In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
Apart from the dark skin of Arabs, it is well known that they are part of the
Mohammedan world and that a wide gulf separates their culture from that of the
predominantly Christian peoples of Europe. It cannot be expected that as a class they
would readily intermarry with our population and be assimilated into our civilization.
Id.; see also EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 280 (1979); Khaled A. Beydoun, Antebellum Islam,
58 HOW. L.J. 141 (2014).
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caricatured to be in a perpetual “state of war”98 and antithetical to the
democratic and liberal cornerstones of the “West.”99 The Orientalist
legacy of conflating “Arab” with “Middle Eastern” and “Muslim
identity” triggers identification of this consolidated group as
terrorists.100 Such conflation, in turn, exacerbates these populations’
vulnerability to both state and societal violence, while it invariably
pushes Arab Americans existentially further and further away from the
whiteness bound to them by law. The MENA box, if added to the 2020
census, may formally put an end to the rigid classification of Arab
Americans as white by law.
B. The Proposed Middle Eastern or North African Box
Ongoing conversations and collaboration between community
stakeholders and the Census Bureau foreshadows possible reform and
reclassification of Arab American identity. 101 In October 2014, the
U.S. Census Bureau introduced a redefinition and schema for MENA
identity that, if adopted, could also lead to possible reform of the OMB
designation.102 The proposal lists the “Middle Eastern or North African
(MENA) category” as one of “four key dimensions to explore.”103 This
exploration began with testing of the proposed MENA box, led by a
series of internal meetings, focus groups, and expert forums examining
the name, language, scope, and structure of the proposed designation.104
Still an extremely fluid process, the proposed language of the MENA
box is tentative, and very likely to be revised before (and if) the new
designation is adopted for the 2020 U.S. census.105
98. Marie A. Failinger, Islam in the Mind of American Courts: 1800 to 1960, 32 B.C. J.L. &
SOC. JUST. 18 (2012).
99. SAID, supra note 97, at 31–92. Said, in this chapter, examines the scope of Orientalism,
and the normative dialectic between the “Occident” (the West) and the “Orient” (the East), which
includes the modern MENA region. In this dialectic, the latter sphere is constructed by the
former as its mirror opposite. Id.
100. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 43–44. “I would suggest that September 11 facilitated the
consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons who appear ‘Middle
Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.’ This consolidation reflects a racialization wherein members of this
group are identified as terrorists, and are disidentified as citizens.” Volpp, supra note 14, at 1576.
101. As an “expert scholar,” I have participated in both informal and formal conversations
regarding the proposed MENA box.
102. See generally 2015 Census Update, supra note 17 (identifying potential framework
updates). If the proposed MENA box is met with consensus from community stakeholders and
the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Census Bureau will then make a recommendation to the OMB
to add the new category its framework.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Id. at 7.
105. See generally id.
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1. Where Is the “Middle East” and “North Africa”
If adopted, the MENA box would formally introduce and construct a
new racial group into the American racial discourse and taxonomy.
During bygone eras, Congress and the civil courts were the chief
institutions that constructed and defined racial classification. Today, the
OMB, in conjunction with the Census Bureau, holds the role of “making
race.”106 Following in the footsteps of the “Asian American” and
“Latin American” boxes, the inclusion of MENA into the 2020 census,
and more broadly, the administrative racial order, would make the
proposed classification the state’s most recent racial creation. In order
to understand the logic and parameters of the proposed MENA box, a
useful first step is investigating its sociopolitical and legal origins.
The “Middle East” and “North Africa” are regions historically,
politically, and culturally disassociated from whiteness. 107 But for
purposes of federal law, people who hail from these regions are
currently classified as white. Commonly viewed as an innate ethnic or
racial classification, Middle Eastern and North African identity—as
either distinct or consolidated identities—are the existential byproducts
of the MENA region, a “malleable geopolitical construct of relatively
recent vintage.”108 MENA today, however, has evolved into a
commonly accepted and pervasively used term that is flexibly used to
refer to a geographic region, a geopolitical sphere, and the populations
they encompass. As a geographic region or geopolitical sphere, the
MENA region is generally viewed to include nineteen nation-states;109
however, the traditional bounds of the region are sometimes broadened
to include an additional ten states located in the Mediterranean, Central
Asia, and Africa.110
106. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting that both government agencies are
commissioned to define and redefine racial classifications, in addition to formulating new ones,
as illustrated by the MENA box).
107. See generally ROBERT J. ALLISON, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE MUSLIM WORLD, 1776–1815 (1995) (explaining the relationship between the United
States and the Muslim word); TIMOTHY MARR, THE CULTURAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
ISLAMICISM (2006) (discussing American Islamicism); SAID, supra note 97 (exemplifying
orientalism and modern imperialism).
108. TEHRANIAN, supra note 8, at 65. “The term ‘Middle East’ likely emerged in the 1850s
from Britain’s India Office . . . . Thus, the designation was borne of geopolitical considerations
and its construction wrought with semiotic meaning.” Id. at 65.
109. Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, the United
Arab Emirates, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia.
110. These ten states are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Djibouti, Georgia, Mauritania,
Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Western Sahara. Hisham Aidi, Middle Eastern Americans Push
Census Change, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 2, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/2/
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Although oriented as a monolith, the MENA region is anything
but.111 Rather, the region is home to a diverse array of peoples, who are
distinct along ethnic, racial, and cultural lines.112 In addition to Arab
nations,113 the MENA region is also home to other indigenous
populations, including “Berbers,”114 Iranians,115 Kurds,116 Turks, and
other non-Arab communities.117 Neither a continent nor a contiguous
landmass, the MENA region is itself a sociopolitical construction
spawned, and reified, for its expediency.
Arab immigrants were pulled to the United States, largely for
economic reasons, from a geopolitically shifting MENA region. The
“first wave” of Arab immigrants arrived in late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.118
This pioneering immigrant wave was

middle-eastern-americans-push-census-change.html. Proponents of the broader definition seek to
include the additional ten states, particularly the African nations, which “would allow for the
counting of Afro-Arab populations, which the U.S. Census has historically undercounted.” Id.
111. SAID, supra note 97, at 63.
112. See generally DANIEL G. BATES & AMAL RASSAM, PEOPLES AND CULTURES OF THE
MIDDLE EAST (2000) (exemplifying the tenants of Islam and Muslim life); ALBERT HOURANI, A
HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES (1992) (presenting a comprehensive history of the region and its
peoples); MEHRAN KAMRAVA, THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST: A POLITICAL HISTORY SINCE THE
FIRST WORLD WAR (2011) (providing a modern political history).
113. “The Arab world, or region, as it is often referred, is not to be confused with the ‘Middle
East’ or the ‘Muslim World,’ which are often conflated in development studies and scholarship at
large.” Khaled A. Beydoun, Fast Tracking Women Into Parliamentary Seats in the Arab World,
17 SW. J. INT’L L. 101, 107 n.27 (2011).
114. See generally BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN, THE BERBER IDENTITY MOVEMENT AND THE
CHALLENGE TO NORTH AFRICAN STATES (2011) (providing a comprehensive history and the
modern challenges to Berber identity in North African nation-states). The Amazigh, discursively
known as the Berbers, are an ethnically distinct people indigenous to North African nations. Id.
115. See generally Nilou Mostofi, Who We Are: The Perplexity of Iranian-American Identity,
44 SOC. Q. 681 (2003) (examining the formation of Iranian-American identity, prefaced by an
analysis of how distinct Iranian customs and traditions inform that process).
116. Visible elements within the Kurdish American community, “fearful of being counted as
Arab,” oppose the proposed MENA box. Staff, Kurdish-Americans Fearful of Being Counted as
‘Arab’ in US Census, RUDAW (Mar. 30, 2015), http://rudaw.net/english/world/04032015.
117. Although these groups are distinct along a range of lines, including culture, history, and
language, they are frequently conflated as being one in the same. This sweeping consolidation of
diverse groupings of people, which is still perpetuated today, is rooted in the discursive
discourses, processes, and mechanisms of “Orientalism.” According to Said, Orientalism is not
an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for
many generations, there has been a considerable material investment. Continued investment
made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering
through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as that same investment multiplied—indeed,
made truly productive—the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture.
Beydoun, supra note 6, at 43–49 (quoting SAID, supra note 97, at 6).
118. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 49–52.
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overwhelmingly Christian and “Levantine.”119 Dissolution of the
Naturalization Act and immigration quotas in 1965 opened the borders
for a more diverse pool of immigrants from the Arab World.120 This
“second wave” of immigrants included a greater number of Arab
Muslims,121 and newcomers from states in Africa, the Gulf, and
segments of the MENA region outside of the Levant.122 As a result of
the second and subsequent waves of immigrants from the region, Arab
America is more heterogeneous today than ever before, and fluidly
diversifying along phenotypic, nationality, religious, and sectarian lines.
Despite the ambiguity of MENA, and its consolidation of a distinct
and diverse set of peoples, many Arab, Middle Eastern, and North
African stakeholders together with the Census Bureau consider the
designation a practical and palatable vehicle for classifying their
identities. Thus, for Americans hailing from the MENA region, racial
identity is conflated with a fluidly shifting and vastly diverse region that
spans across twenty-nine states and three continents.123
2. Vision 2020: The MENA Box
The proposed MENA box is built upon the political and discursive
constructions of “Middle Eastern” and “North African.” Yet, despite its
dubious origins, the proposed classification stands to materially reform
the per se classification and conception of Arab American identity.
First, the proposal would redact “Middle East and North Africa” from
the preexisting “White” category.124
Second, it would shift these geographic designations into a
standalone MENA category, as one of eight options an applicant may
119. ALIXA NAFF, BECOMING AMERICAN: THE EARLY ARAB IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE 112
(1985) (explaining that the “Levant” is the region encompassing modern day Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan, Israel, and Palestine).
120. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153. This era is also referred to as the “National
Quota Regime Era.”
121. Suleiman, supra note 1, at 1; see KAMBIZ GHANEABASSIRI, A HISTORY OF ISLAM IN
AMERICA: FROM THE NEW WORLD TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER 303–06 (2010) (discussing how
political turbulence in the Arab World spurred Arab Muslim migration, and upon arrival, shaped
activism, identification, and organizing); see also Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in the
Alienation or Support For Extremism, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.people-press.
org/2011/08/30/muslim-americans-no-signs-of-growth-in-alienation-or-support-for-extremism
(providing a general analysis of Muslim American demographic data today, which features
figures on immigration from Arab states).
122. KAYYALI, supra note 1, at 33 (“[B]etween 1965 and 1992, more than 400,000 Arab
immigrants arrived in the United States because of the changes in the immigration law and
quotas.”); see also ORFALEA, supra note 1 (analyzing the Arab community in a modern society).
123. Africa, Asia, and Europe (Turkey spans both Asia and Europe).
124. 2015 Census Update, supra note 17, at 17.
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choose while filling out the 2020 U.S. census.125
Third, the proposed MENA designation, like its seven counterparts,
would be supplemented with a fillable box, allowing the applicant to
“print specific ethnicities” that fall within the broader (racial or ethnic)
classification.126 As a result, applicants are enabled to not only identify
along new ethnic or racial terms, but additionally, specify to which
subgroup or nationality they belong. For instance, Arab American
applicants would be able to write in “Arab American” or “Moroccan
American” into the fillable box, articulating their identities in the
manner they see fit, in addition to identifying broadly as MENA.
As of November 2015, the Census Bureau is still exploring whether
to label the new MENA box as a race or an ethnicity. 127 Internal
debates regarding the terminology, combined with different outlooks
within the Arab American and broader MENA communities, have
created differences as to how the proposed classification should be
framed. This point of contention, however, is not isolated, but
emblematic of a broad set of differences with regard to the overall
construction of the proposed category. The fact that the MENA region
“was invented from political considerations, not natural geography,”128
has begged the question of whether the groups should be consolidated
into one classification at all. In addition, the expanse and ambiguity of
the MENA region has also been the source of debate as to what the final
title of the proposed category should be. However, whether framed as
ancestry, ethnicity, or race, the MENA classification would still have
the functional effect of racially distinguishing “MENAs” from the per
se White box,129 and identify those who claim it as a distinct and
independent racial group.
A sensitive and fluid process, the Census Bureau’s initiative and
efforts around pushing the MENA box forward illustrates that reform
and reclassification is likely. The classification and language currently
presented may very well change,130 but plans are well underway to
125. Id. The other seven options would include: (1) White; (2) Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish
origin; (3) Black or African American; (4) Asian; (5) American Indian or Alaska Native; (6)
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander; and (7) Some other race or ethnicity. Id. An applicant
is not limited to selecting just one box, but may select all of those that apply to his or her identity.
Id.
126. Id. The current proposed language posits: “Print specific ethnicities, for example,
Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Syrian, Moroccan, Algerian, etc.” Id.
127. Id. at 19.
128. Tehranian, supra note 12, at 1211.
129. Individuals who identify as MENA.
130. 2015 Census Update, supra note 17, at 17, 19.
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dislodge the MENA region from the White category, and subsequently,
construct a separate and standalone box in its specific name. With
roughly four years before the 2020 U.S. census, the momentum toward
adopting the MENA box is on par with the velocity of intensifying state
surveillance and policing of Arab Americans, two previously parallel
movements that, at present, are heading toward convergence.
III. WHY NOW? CONVERGING TOWARD REFORM
Much has changed since 1952. Whiteness is no longer a prerequisite
for citizenship.131 The demographic composition of Arab America has
diversified.
The geopolitical landscape of the Arab World is
dramatically different, and experiencing a new state of flux. 132 And, the
association of Arab American identity with a national security menace,
terrorism,133 and “homegrown terrorism,”134 is deepening. These latter
stereotypes were bolstered after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 135 and today,
take on an added dimension with the rise of transnational terrorist
networks like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”).136
While Orientalist tropes tying Arab American identity to violence

131. The year the Naturalization Act of 1790 was dissolved, and whiteness was no longer
mandated as a prerequisite for citizenship.
132. The politics of the region, particularly within the last five years, have been extremely
volatile. The “Arab Spring” revolutions, which commenced in Tunisia in December 2011,
spurred a number of popular revolutions throughout the Arab World. See generally HAMID
DABASHI, THE ARAB SPRING: THE END OF POSTCOLONIALISM (2012) (providing a political
history of the revolutions, in addition to an analysis of their impact on the nations where they
unfolded, and the region at large). However, the period after the revolutions spiraled into the still
ongoing phase of intensifying sectarian saber-rattling and tensions in the Arab World, best
represented with the rise of ISIS, the Syrian War, the rising tension between Saudi Arabia and
Iran, and the proxy wars throughout the region. See generally FREDERIC M. WEHREY,
SECTARIAN POLITICS IN THE GULF: FROM THE IRAQ WAR TO THE ARAB UPRISINGS (2013)
(examining rising sectarian politics and proxy wars in the Arab World).
133. Khyati Y. Joshi, The Racialization of Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism in the United States,
39 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 211, 217 (2006).
The racialization of Islam intersects with the West’s encounters with enemies whose
ideological identity is intimately linked to their interpretation and use of Islam. As a
result, brown-skinned, non-Christian Americans become more (or less) than just an
other within the society; they become an other who is associated with a foreign enemy.
Id.
134. Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. L.J. 147, 156
(2014).
135. Volpp, supra note 14, at 1586.
136. ISIS was designated a terrorist group by the Department of State on December 17, 2004,
but emerged as a distinct geopolitical threat roughly a decade later. Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2016).
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and subversion preceded the 9/11 attacks,137 the Bush administration
introduced sweeping surveillance and policing reform that directed its
focus on Arab, MENA, Muslim Americans,138 and other communities
that fit within the “Arab caricature.”139 The War on Terror ushered in
federal law enforcement and surveillance programs that exacerbated the
“punitive treatment of Arab and Muslim noncitizens,”140 built upon the
baseline that linked Arab, MENA, and Muslim American identity with a
propensity for terrorism. As a result of the broadening dragnet, the civil
liberties of Arab Americans eroded dramatically, and their already
stigmatized status spiraled even deeper.141 Ultimately, these post-9/11
federal programs created even greater dissonance and distance between
Arab America’s per se whiteness and de facto otherness.142
Despite community efforts beginning in the early 1980s to reconcile
this racial misalignment,143 the Census Bureau repeatedly stood against
the reform and reclassification of Arab Americans. Arab American
organizations and stakeholders fully appreciate the “critically important
social, political and humanitarian functions” that the U.S. census
recognition serves,144 and have therefore grappled with the top-down
assignment of whiteness for decades. While community efforts pushing

137. Beydoun, supra note 6.
138. Akram & Johnson, supra note 10, at 295. President George W. Bush, and members of
his administration, regularly referred to the “War on Terror” as a “clash of civilizations,”
“religious war,” and “crusade,” echoing the rhetoric from the provocative book The Clash of
Civilizations by Samuel P. Huntington. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (emphasizing cultural identity
and the shift in the balance of power among civilizations).
139. Natsu T. Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the Racing of
Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 ASIAN AM. L.J. 1, 12 (2001) (“[A]rab Americans and
Muslims have been ‘raced’ as ‘terrorists’: foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening.
Although Arabs trace their roots to the Middle East and claim many different religious
backgrounds, and Muslims come from all over the world . . . these distinctions are blurred and
negative images about either Arabs or Muslims are often attributed to both.”).
140. Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After
September 11th, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1376
(2007).
141. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 10 (evaluating the effect of 9/11 on the Arab
community); see also Jamal, supra note 14, at 117–18 (stating the post-9/11 moment, marked by
the enactment of USA PATRIOT Act, ushered intensified surveillance, monitoring, and suspicion
of Arab American communities).
142. Alia Malek, “Dying with the Wrong Name”: The Role of Racializing and Erasing Arabs
in America, 1 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 211, 212 (2009) (“There is a
longstanding and substantial dissonance between the official classification of Arab Americans as
‘White’ and how they feel and are treated in the United States.”).
143. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1305.
144. Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at 482.
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for reform and reclassification of Arab American identity have been
committed and continuous, a paradigmatic shift in national security
strategy may be the pivotal domino that triggers the adoption of a
standalone MENA box on the 2020 census.
This Part examines key antecedents of present discussions and
tentative plans for implementing the MENA box into the 2020 census.
Section A articulates the existential, political, legal, and economic
benefits Arab Americans stand to gain with the adoption of the MENA
category. Section B explores the pressing national security aims that
converge with the interests of Arab American interests, and which may
be the critical catalyst pushing reform and reclassification of Arab
American identity forward.
A. Community Efforts Toward Racial Reform
Community efforts to reform the racial classification of Arab
Americans from white to nonwhite began in the 1980s.145 Arab
American organizations launched initiatives that were driven by a desire
to align the per se racial designation with the legal treatment of their
constituents, and to facilitate “policy decisions, particularly for civil
rights” that would afford greater legal protections to Arab Americans.146
More robust interventions for reform were developed in the 1990s.147
These efforts came in reaction to the first World Trade Center attack in
1993,148 the Oklahoma City Bombing two years later149 (which was
committed by white, non-Arab culprits),150 and the enactment of the
145. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1305.
146. About Race, supra note 4; see also Samhan Testimony, supra note 58.
147. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1304–05.
148. Commonly known as the “First World Trade Center Bombing,” preceding the terrorist
attacks on the same site on September 11, 2011. See GHANEABASSIRI, supra note 121, at 337–40
(providing a concise historical account of the first World Trade Center bombing); see also Robert
T. McFadden, Blast Hits Trade Center, Bomb Suspected; 5 Killed, Thousands Flee Smoke in
Towers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/
0226.html#article.
149. David Johnston, Terror in Oklahoma: The Overview; Oklahoma Bombing Plotted for
Months, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1995), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=990CE2D81238F936A15757C0A963958260.
150. Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 140, at 1374 (explaining that “in response to the bombing
of the federal building in Oklahoma City perpetrated by U.S. citizens . . . Congress passed two
punitive immigration reform laws [in 1996] that went well beyond having anything to do with
terrorism” and the subsequently enacted anti-terrorism laws that disparately targeted Arab,
MENA, and Muslim Americans); see also Tung Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber
the Only White Terrorists?: Race, Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. &
C.L.L. REV. 33 (2012) (providing an account of instances of domestic terrorism perpetrated by
white radicals).
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Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) in
1996.151 These external developments, among others,152 intensified
societal prejudice toward Arab Americans and enhanced state suspicion
and policing of both Arab noncitizens and citizens.153
To accelerate reform, the Arab American Institute, or AAI, and the
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (“ADC”)—the two
flagship Arab American advocacy groups—intensified their efforts to
procure a standalone “Arab American” ancestry or racial box for the
2000 U.S census.154 However, the OMB rejected their proposals on
several grounds, citing: (1) the complexity associated with defining the
group; (2) discord among MENAs about how to frame and title the
classification; (3) administrative challenges associated with assessing
discrimination faced by Arab and MENAs; and (4) the Arab American
population falling short of the threshold population level needed to be
considered for distinct minority status.155 Therefore, while the AEDPA
and escalating discrimination targeting Arab Americans deepened state
and societal views that the group was not white, the Census Bureau
maintained the per se classification.
After 9/11, the racial misalignment of Arab Americans intensified.
State surveillance and societal animus toward Arab Americans rose
considerably, exposing the stark contradiction that the whiteness
assigned to Arab Americans did not extend beyond the four corners of
the U.S. census form. The USA PATRIOT Act,156 enacted into law
roughly a month after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, proliferated state
151. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244–2266 (2012). Several years after the enactment of AEDPA, the
ADC issued a know-your-rights pamphlet to its membership about the Act and its specific lawenforcement functions. See also HOUEIDA SAAD & KAMAL NAWASH, ADC RES. INST., A GUIDE
TO THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENS, RESIDENTS AND VISITORS IN THE
UNITED STATES 16–18 (1999).
152. In addition to domestic incidents, Operation Desert Storm in Iraq (1990–1991), the
Palestine-Israeli Conflict, and other events in the Arab World and MENA region impacted state
and societal perceptions of Arab Americans. GHANEABASSIRI, supra note 121, at 332–36.
153. Ahmad, supra note 9, at 1270–71.
154. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1305–06.
155. The four explanations outlined above will hereinafter be referred to as “state
justifications for maintaining Arab Americans as white by law.” TEHRANIAN, supra note 8, at
169.
156. See generally George W. Bush, President, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
Nation (Sept. 20, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html. In an address to Congress and the Nation days after 9/11, Bush explained what
purpose the USA PATRIOT Act would serve in the war on terror: “Our war on terror begins with
Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped and defeated. . . . We will come together to give law enforcement the
additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home.” Id.

15_BEYDOUN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

720

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

3/31/2016 5:57 PM

[Vol. 47

suspicion and surveillance of Arab, MENA, and Muslim American
communities.157 The 9/11 attacks also led to the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security,158 which oversaw immigration and
emigration, and functioned as the institutional fulcrum for federal and
local anti-terror surveillance and policing.
Despite past failures, community efforts seeking per se
reclassification of Arab American identity persisted. The “Check it
Right, You Ain’t White” campaign generated popular appeal in 2010,159
and “urged people to check ‘some other race’ on the [2010 census] form
and write in their ancestry.”160 Three years later, an AAI-led campaign
that called for “a broadly accepted definition of the MENA region,”
generated
unprecedented
momentum
toward
reform
and
161
reclassification.
This proposal veered from past demands seeking a
standalone “Arab American” box on the U.S. census,162 and sought to
overcome the government’s reasoning for maintaining Arab Americans
as white by law. The intervention opened the door for the proposed
MENA box, which is a broader classification that includes other groups
from the MENA region in addition to Arab Americans.163 Tentative
157. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; see also Patriot
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006)
(codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a
Preventative Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429
(2012) (summarizing how post-9/11 laws and policies have been selectively enforced against
Muslim and Arabs in the United States).
158. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.) (describing generally what purposes and
functions the Department of Homeland Security would serve, most notably in the areas of
national security and immigration policy and programming).
159. Newsweek Staff, Arab-Americans Aim to Increase Their Census Count, NEWSWEEK
(Feb. 8, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/arab-americans-aim-increase-their-censuscount-75311.
160. Krogstad, supra note 29.
161. See Letter Am. Arab Inst., et al., to Enrique Lamas, Assoc. Dir. of Demographic
Programs, U.S. Bureau of the Census (July 24, 2013) [hereinafter “AAI Letter to the U.S. Census
Bureau”], http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/general/Arab-Institute-Letter-to-Enrique.pdf (indicating
that “[c]urrent OMB guidelines that simply classify persons from the MENA region as white by
race are no longer accurate or useful” and proposing a “broadly accepted definition of the MENA
region that allows data to be collected across racial lines, similar to Hispanic Origin”).
162. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1305 (noting that in the mid-1980s, the AAI “explored the
possibility of adding a hyphenated ‘Arab-American’ as an example of ancestry in the 1990
Census”).
163. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 8, at 8 (arguing that a Middle Eastern American box, would
“serve as a vehicle to highlight the shared experiences of members of the group as the Other and
to provide a more unified voice to address the particular set of challenges facing the Middle
Eastern population”); see also John Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness: Towards a Middle
Eastern Legal Scholarship, 82 IND. L.J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness]
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acceptance of the MENA box by the Arab American community has
pushed forward discussions between community stakeholders and the
Census Bureau.
A range of interests drives Arab American communities and
stakeholders support of the proposed MENA box. These interests can
be divided in four types: (1) existential, (2) political, (3) legal, and (4)
economic. Pursuit of a standalone MENA box on the U.S. census
vividly illustrates Nathaniel Persily’s claim that the census is
fundamentally about “representation, money, and race.”164 Census
tabulations “are used to allocate almost $400 billion in federal funds
every year,”165 with a portion of those funds earmarked specifically to
minority groups. These resources, if procured, would extend benefits
and protections to Arab Americans, which not only recognize but also
aim to mitigate their subjugated status.166
1. Existential Interests
Racial self-determination has long eluded Arab Americans. Since the
first newcomer from the Arab World came before a court seeking to be
naturalized as an American citizen,167 some facet of the law—such as
the immigration code, civil courts, or administrative racial
designations—has driven a wedge between Arab and American identity.
Racially restrictive immigration laws segregated Arab and American
identity until 1944;168 followed by seven decades of top-down assigned
whiteness, which rendered Arab Americans formally “invisible” on one
hand, but disparately profiled and policed on the other.169
(arguing in favor of the initiation of critical legal studies which are focus in particular on the
Middle East).
164. Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to
Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755, 756 (2011); see also Bhatnagar,
supra note 36, at 87–88 (characterizing the census as an effort to facilitate the distribution of
funds for various social initiatives, including “[e]ducation grants, affirmative action programs,
community reinvestment and development, public health programs, mortgage lending, lowincome housing tax credits, voting rights, employment rights, legislative redistricting,
government contracting, food stamps, and veteran benefits”).
165. El Nasser, supra note 82.
166. BOSNIAK, supra note 44, at 30–31.
167. See Sarah Gualtieri, Syrian Immigrants and Debates on Racial Belonging in Los Angeles,
1875-1945, SYRIAN STUD. ASS’N NEWSL., Winter 2009, at 1.
168. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 34.
169. See generally TEHRANIAN, supra note 8. Tehranian invokes the idea of “invisibility” to
describe the U.S. census conflation of Arab and MENA as per se white, and thus, not counted as a
distinct group although singled out by state policing and enforcement of post-9/11 surveillance
practices. Thus, for Tehranian, formal invisibility is juxtaposed with a functional treatment of
Arabs and MENAs as not only a visible group, but also one that must be closely monitored.
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The proposed MENA category will, presumptively, put an end to 111
years of the state defining, and assigning, the legal parameters of Arab
American identity.170 The adoption of the category will afford Arab
Americans unprecedented self-determination over racial identification:
“The development of the category for Middle Eastern racial status will
limit the pernicious process of selective racialization and will enable
Middle Eastern Americans to take control of a category already being
imposed on them from without.”171
Although critiqued by some as “too broad” or “limiting,” the two-part
structure of the proposed MENA category affords applicants the
unprecedented latitude to personalize the racial and national dimensions
of their identity in line with how they subjectively view their
identities.172 As discussed in Part I.B, the proposed box will allow
applicants to first check “MENA” and second, write “Arab American”
in the following box, if they prefer a broader, ethnic classification.173
On the other hand, applicants may identify along more specific
nationality lines, such as “Egyptian” or “Moroccan” for instance;174 or
alternatively, for ethnic and religious minority groups from the region,
they may write in “Coptic” or “Berber,” if such identity modalities are
more favorable.175
By affording applicants the option to identify along primary racial
and secondary national, ethnic, and even tribal lines, the proposed
MENA box extends the existential self-determination Arab Americans
have long coveted. The proposed reform and reclassification supplants
state paternalism with deference to Arab American applicants, and
aligns the per se designation of the group with how the vast majority of

“Such a new category solves the problem of MENA population group data being invisible in the
current racial framework.” AAI Letter to the U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 161, at 1.
170. The date is measured from the date of the Shishim case (1909) to the proposed adoption
of the MENA category (2020). Gualtieri, supra note 68.
171. TEHRANIAN, supra note 8, at 8.
172. 2015 Census Update, supra note 17, at 17.
173. See supra note 121–122, and accompanying text (identifying as Arab American, instead
of a specific nationality, generally manifests an affinity for a Pan-Arab identity).
174. 2015 Census Update, supra note 17, at 17.
175. Many indigenous populations in the Arab World and the broader MENA region,
including Kurds in the Levant and Gulf, Berbers in the “Maghreb,” Copts and Nubians in Egypt
and the Sudan, Jews throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and segments of the Maronite
Catholic community in Lebanon, resist Arab identity because it threatened other modes of ethnic,
tribal, or sectarian nationalism. In many contexts, such as Algeria or Egypt, minority
communities that rejected Arab nationalism were persecuted. In addition, many of these groups
also reject identifying along lines of their host nations because of this past persecution and
present political tension.
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the state, and society, perceives Arab Americans. The government’s
recognition of the group’s racial (or ethnic) distinctness, coupled with
the ability to specify one’s identity within the broader framework of the
MENA box, is of tremendous value to Arab Americans.
2. Political Interests
Supporters of a standalone MENA box contend that reform and
reclassification will facilitate greater political visibility and influence
over electoral politics.176 With regard to local, state, and federal
elections, per se recognition of Arab Americans will endorse and
identify them as a distinct voting bloc which, in turn, will attract greater
courtship from political candidates and elected officials177: “A
standalone MENA box will increase the awareness of candidates and
campaigns to target and tailor specific messages in areas with
significant Arab American voting blocs.”178 By facilitating a more
accurate tallying of the Arab American population, a census with the
MENA box will mitigate the political costs spawned by
undercounting.179
Proponents of the MENA box also argue that it will lead to enhanced
Arab American political participation180 and access to the ballot box.
Existing laws mandate that ballots be availed in minority languages
prominently spoken within a given voting district.181 Therefore, in
Arab American heavy districts, including Paterson, New Jersey; 182
Allentown, Pennsylvania;183 Anaheim, California;184 and Dearborn185
176. See U.S. Mulls Middle East-North Africa Category for 2020 Census, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/30/us/ap-us-census-counting-arabs.html
(“Those pushing for the MENA classification say it would more fully and accurately count them,
thus increasing their visibility and influence among policymakers.”).
177. Persily, supra note 164, at 766.
178. Interview with Mohamed Maraqa, Vice President of Strategic Partnerships, Blue Labs, in
Wash., D.C. (Apr. 4, 2015).
179. AAI DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 78 (estimating that the per se designation of white has
led to a 60% undercounting of Arab Americans).
180. In 2006, the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars compiled the works of
various researchers, which examined the potential for political participation of the Arab American
Community. WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, AMERICAN ARABS AND
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (Philippa Strum ed., 2006), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default
/files/DUSS_Arab_America.pdf.
181. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
182. QuickFacts: Paterson, New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census
.gov/qfd/states/34/3457000.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
183. QuickFacts: Allentown, Pennsylvania, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census
.gov/qfd/states/42/4202000.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
184. QuickFacts: Anaheim, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
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and Hamtramck,186 Michigan, a formal count of Arab Americans would
compel the state to provide ballots in Arabic. Ballots translated into
Arabic would increase voter turnout among Arabic speakers.187 In light
of a sizable number of recent Arab American immigrants, facilitating
voting access for those with limited English fluency would augment
Arab American political power, and in the short term, provide greater
influence in local and state races.188
Proponents of the MENA box contend that enhanced political
visibility and influence of Arab Americans will also spur greater
matriculation of Arab Americans into electoral politics. Although there
are Arab American congressmen and women, judges, and other elected
or appointed officials in thirty-five states,189 and seven on the federal
level,190 reform and reclassification of Arab American identity will
engender the community empowerment necessary to increase these
numbers.
Finally, a MENA classification may inspire greater
collaboration and cooperation between distinct subsets of the group,
which will jointly and severally enhance their political influence.
3. Legal Interests
Per se whiteness has not extended Arab Americans access to the legal
protections warranted by escalating state surveillance and societal
animus.191 Rather, it has enhanced the vulnerability and deepened the
qfd/states/06/0602000.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
185. QuickFacts: Dearborn, Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/26/2621000.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
186. QuickFacts: Hamtramck, Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/26/2636280.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
187. Arab American Roster, ARAB AM. INST. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.aaiusa.org/arabamerican-roster.
188. In addition, the MENA box will also formally proscribe discrimination against Arab
Americans with regard to voter registration and public accommodations, under Titles I and II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
See generally Michael T. Morley, Enforcing Equality: Statutory Injunctions, Equitable Balancing
Under eBay, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177 (providing a discussion
of statutory injunctions against racial discrimination within the voting context).
189. The American Community Survey, in 2009, revealed that Arabic is the ninth most
spoken language in the United States. 2009 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates:
Summary File, DEP’T. OF COM., https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/2009-american-communitysurvey-1-year-estimates-summary-file (last updated Sept. 17, 2015).
190. Id.
191. On February 27, 2015, following a string of attacks on Arab Americans, the FBI
amended its policies by introducing measures to track hate crimes against Arab Americans. See
generally CRIM. JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FBI, HATE CRIMES DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES
AND TRAINING MANUAL (2015), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime-data-collectionguidelines-and-training-manual.pdf.
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injuries inflicted upon Arab Americans: “Reified as the other,
Americans of Middle Eastern descent do not enjoy the benefits of white
privilege. Yet, as whites under the law, they are generally denied the
fruits of remedial action.”192
In St. Francis v. Al-Khazarji, an Iraqi professor sued St. Francis
University on grounds that he was denied tenure because he was an
Arab.193 The Supreme Court deferred to the OMB designation that
Arabs were white, but ruled that Arabs could nevertheless bring an
ethnic discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title IV.194
The Al-Khazarji ruling, decided in 1987, highlighted division within
the state regarding how to treat and classify Arab American identity.
The Supreme Court found that Arab American identity was a partly
distinct, or an “off-white,”195 status that warranted employment
discrimination protection.196 Applying a disparate impact standard to
discrimination along national origin lines, Al-Khazarji “was a
significant ruling because it became possible for Arabs to claim
discrimination while being considered ‘white,’ and without being
officially recognized as a minority group.”197 In addition, the ruling
equipped proponents of racial reform and reclassification with judicial
endorsement from the highest court in the land that Arab Americans
could suffer discrimination on grounds of their “nationality” or “place
of origin”—proxies for race and ethnicity.198
192. See TEHRANIAN, supra note 8, at 3; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1707 (1993), for greater discussion of the privileges attached to whiteness.
In ways so embedded that it is rarely apparent, the set of assumptions, privileges, and
benefits that accompany the status of being white have become a valuable asset that
whites sought to protect and that those who passed sought to attain . . . . Whites have
come to expect and rely on these benefits, and over time these expectations have been
affirmed, legitimated, and protected by the law.
Id. at 1710.
193. St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
194. Id.
195. Laura E. Gomez, Off-White in an Age of White Supremacy: Mexican Elites and the
Rights of Indians and Blacks in Nineteenth Century New Mexico, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 9,
11 (2005).
196. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (establishing that all persons under the
jurisdictions of the United States shall have the full and equal benefit of all laws as is enjoyed by
white citizens).
197. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1307. In 1997, the ADC published a pamphlet to its Arab
American constituents, titled Unmasking Job Discrimination, which highlighted the possible legal
redress and relief Arab American victims of workplace discrimination could seek. See generally
HOUEIDA SAAD, UNMASKING JOB DISCRIMINATION: WHAT EVERY ARAB AMERICAN SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE (1997).
198. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613 (“If respondent [on remand] can prove that he was
subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than
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Seeking to extend the reach of Al-Khazarji, proponents of the MENA
box contended that its adoption would expand protection against
discrimination for Arab Americans. In 1993, the AAI and ADC
“lobbied Congress to create a separate ‘Middle Eastern’ or ‘Arab
American’ category, arguing that, by moving from the ‘Caucasian’
category, they would obtain eligibility for certain remedial programs
and better protection under antidiscrimination laws.”199 This is
particularly true with regard to hate crimes protection, which may be
“reported by religious affiliation or country of origin,” but not along
Arab or MENA lines.200 The surge in hate crimes against Arab
Americans after 9/11 exposed the deleterious effect per se whiteness
had on the group, and its inability to carry forward protective efforts
against discrimination.201
Per se designation of Arab Americans as white continues to mar the
group’s access to legal protection from hate crimes. Currently, hate
crimes legislation counts Arab Americans as white, and in turn, does not
track anti-Arab motivated violence and hate crimes. However, the
string of attacks targeting Arab Americans in early 2015,202 including
the murder of three university students in Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
on February 10, 2015,203 highlights that anti-Arab bigotry in the United
States is rising.204 Hate crimes protection along racial lines would
solely on the place or nation of his origin or his religion, he will have made out a § 1981 case.”).
199. TEHRANIAN, supra note 8, at 168.
200. AAI Letter to the U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 161, at 3.
201. See AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., REPORT ON HATE CRIMES AND
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB AMERICANS: THE POST SEPTEMBER 11TH BACKLASH (2003),
http://www.mbda.gov/sites/default/files/September_11_Backlash.pdf. “Since 2001, the U.S.
Department of Justice has investigated over 800 incidents of violence, vandalism, and arson
against people the Department believed to be Muslim, Arab, or South Asian.” Carlo A. Pedrioli,
Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law, and the Constitutional Consequences of
Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 65, 73 (2012) (asserting the formal
whiteness of Arab Americans greatly diminished the ability of state and non-state actors to collect
hate crimes data linked to increased violence against the population).
202. Khaled A. Beydoun, Many Faces of Hate: The Distinct Forms of Anti-Arab Bigotry and
Violence, NAT’L NETWORK OF ARAB-AM. COMMUNITIES WHITE PAPER SERIES (Nat’l Network
of Arab-Am. Communities, Dearborn, Mich.).
203. See Jonathan M. Katz & Richard Pérez-Peña, In Chapel Hill Shooting of 3 Muslims, A
Question of Motive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/us/muslimstudent-shootings-north-carolina.html; see also Khaled A. Beydoun & Nadia El-Zein Tonova,
Why Muslim Lives Don’t Matter, AL-JAZEERA ENGLISH (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.aljazeera
.com/indepth/opinion/2015/02/muslim-lives-don-matter-150212052018920.html (both articles
examine the execution of three Arab American students, targeted on grounds of race or religion,
or both).
204. See generally Beydoun, supra note 202 (highlighting the recent resurgence in anti-Arab
discrimination).
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enhance tracking and deterrence of race-based discrimination and
violence toward Arab Americans.205 Formal racial alignment by the
OMB and the Census Bureau would garner enhanced protection against
private and public discrimination, and spur adoption of hate crimes
legislation that monitors and tracks discrimination against Arab (and
MENA) Americans.
Finally, access to affirmative action is another legal interest driving
support for reforming the status of Arab Americans as white. College
and university affirmative action programs, although eroded by recent
Supreme Court rulings206 and state referenda,207 do not formally
consider Arab Americans a distinct minority or ethnic group. 208 Access
to affirmative action within the context of college and university
admissions is a primary interest driving reform,209 framed along the
prevailing jurisprudential rationales that higher rates of Arab Americans
in higher education would first, enhance “campus and classroom
diversity,”210 and second, remedy past and present discrimination.211
205. Id.
206. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978). See generally Eang L. Ngov, Following Fisher: Narrowly Tailoring Affirmative
Action, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2014) (analyzing how the court in Fisher further limited the use
of race for university admissions through its administration of the narrow tailoring standard).
207. See Khaled Ali Beydoun, Without Color of Law: The Losing Race Against
Colorblindness in Michigan, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 465 (2007) (examining the Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative, a citizen initiative that effectively prohibited affirmative action based on race,
color, sex, or religion).
208. This is a direct consequence of the OMB’s and U.S. Census Bureau’s per se
classification of people from the MENA region as white, which is the generally adopted schema
on college applications. See Raja Abdulrahim, Students Push UC to Expand Terms of Ethnic
Identification: Middle Easterners Want Alternatives to ‘White’ and ‘Other,’ L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1,
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/31/local/me-arab31 (discussing lobbying efforts by
University of California MENA students towards the administration to offer additional racial
alternatives beyond “white” and “other”).
209. Whether Arab Americans should have access to affirmative action, and race-conscious
college and university admissions, is a debate beyond the scope of this Article. Proponents argue
that past and present discrimination of Arab Americans should be the basis that justifies access to
affirmative action. See Christine Tamer, Arab Americans, Affirmative Action, and a Quest for
Racial Identity, 16 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 101 (2010) (arguing that universities should recognize
Arab Americans as a minority for the purposes of their race-based affirmative action programs
because Arab Americans contribute to the diversity rationale as set forth by the Supreme Court).
In contrast, I favor the position that Arab Americans are statistically overrepresented at colleges
and universities, particularly elite institutions, and thus, do not merit the underrepresented status
that makes access to affirmative action compelling.
210. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; see also TEHRANIAN, supra note 8, at 166 (“Middle Easterners
contribute as meaningfully as any minority group to racial and cultural diversity.”).
211. Tamer, supra note 209, at 102 (although remedying past and present discrimination is no
longer a compelling state interest justifying consideration of race in college admissions practices).
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4. Economic Interests
Per se minority status would also grant Arab American businesses
access to minority business contracts distributed by the government.212
In January 2012, the ADC filed a petition lobbying the U.S. Department
of Commerce to count Arab Americans as a “disadvantaged
minority.”213 The 2012 filing followed an earlier attempt by the ADC
in 2006, which was denied by the Department of Commerce.214
Economic interests drove both legal interventions, and namely, access
to government contracts set aside for “disadvantaged, minority-owned
businesses.”215
Moreover, the proposed MENA box for the 2020 U.S. census would
compel the Department of Commerce to adopt the new designation and,
at minimum, probe whether Arab and MENA Americans qualify as a
“disadvantaged minority group” warranting access to Small Business
Administration (“SBA”) funds and government contracts.216 Like in
other minority communities, small businesses are commonly held by,
and core to the economic lifeline of, Arab Americans.217 Although
owners of these businesses are disproportionate targets of racism and
discrimination, the per se classification of Arab Americans as white
precludes them from accessing vital SBA funds, and frequently compels
them to partner with members of (legally) recognized minority groups
to access these funds.218
In addition to the core economic interests driving reclassification
efforts, the proposed MENA box will also have a cascading impact
within public and private institutions at large. The per se recognition of

212. On May 19, the ADC filed an application to the Director of the Minority Business
Development Agency (“MBDA”) of the United States, “requesting formal recognition of the
Arab-American community as a minority group that is socially or economically disadvantaged,”
pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 1400. Internal Memorandum from the ADC to the MBDA (May 19,
2011) (on file with author); see also Khaled A. Beydoun, The Business of Remaking ArabAmerican Identity, AL JAZEERA (June 15, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/
06/2012610114257813921.html.
213. Beydoun, supra note 212.
214. Afzal Khan, Arab-American Businesses Seek Government Contracts: Entrepreneurs
Support Preferential Treatment for Arab-American Business, AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMM. (June 26, 2006), http://www.adc.org/2006/06/arab-american-businesses-seek-government
-contracts.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. ARAB DETROIT 9/11, supra note 11, at 82–83.
218. “As small business owners, a rising number of them [Arab Americans] are selling 51%
of their businesses to minority partners in order to obtain minority status with the Small Business
Administration.” AAI Letter to the U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 161, at 3.
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MENAs as a separate ethnic group will alter how public and private
actors perceive Arab Americans, and in turn, classify them internally.
Furthermore, administrative recognition of Arab Americans as a
minority group may trigger greater inclusion of the group in formal
recruitment efforts, diversity programming, ethnic and race-conscious
hiring practices, and promotional strategies that capitalize on the “social
and economic value” of Arab identity.219 Finally, per se reform and
reclassification of Arab Americans on the U.S. census may usher in a
range of progressive developments with regard to healthcare policy,
administration, research, and analytics.220
B. Shifting Government Interests
The proposed MENA category will mark Arab Americans as a
minority group, aligning with discursive and national security views of
the population.
However, for government agencies vested in
monitoring the population, such as the NSA, the proposed reform and
reclassification of Arab American identity will also produce precise and
comprehensive demographic data about a population perceived to be a
potential “fifth column.”221
This Section illustrates how the State’s national security interests—
particularly following the War on Terror—facilitated the shift toward
serious consideration and prospective adoption of the MENA category
in the 2020 U.S. census. By offering a general survey of the State’s
219. For instance, the military using Arab Americans on their promotional literature to appeal
to and draw from Arab American communities for prospective enlistees; similarly, an American
law firm with considerable business interests in the Gulf positioning Arab American lawyers in
key, visible positions, as strategy to enhance their resonance. See generally Nancy Leong, Racial
Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013) (examining instances of radical capitalism, where
predominately white institutions use nonwhite people to acquire social and economic value).
220. The AAI argues that the following three problems created by the status quo will be
resolved by the proposed MENA box:
1) Researchers are unable to study accurately vital data such as mortality rates, fertility
rates due to lack of a reliable denominator (one with a small margin of error); 2)
Collecting data on persons of MENA origin upon admission to hospitals and other
healthcare facilities is impossible because they are aggregated under the white race.
Therefore, learning more about ethnic-specific diseases such as lactose intolerance
among these populations is not possible; 3) Obtaining research funding to study
MENA origin populations in the U.S. is also difficult because none of the official
government entities consider them as distinct populations.
AAI Letter to the U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 161, at 3. See generally MAPPING “RACE”:
CRITICAL APPROACHES TO HEALTH DISPARITIES RESEARCH (Laura E. Gómez & Nancy López
eds., 2013), for an excellent anthology on how firmer demographic data enhances healthcare
research and analytics.
221. Joshi, supra note 133, at 224 n.10. “A clandestine group that is allied with a foreign
enemy force.” Id.
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rising interest in more precise and finite demographic data about Arab
Americans, this Section informs the focus of Part IV.A: how coveted
demographic “macro- and mesodata” enhances anti-terrorism law
enforcement.222
1. Before the War on Terror
The government firmly opposed racial reform of Arab American
identity before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.223 In the mid-1990s, a number
of Arab American organizations, leaders, and stakeholders convened
with the Census Bureau to discuss reform. However, “[t]he OMB
recommendations in the Federal Register concluded that an Arab or
Middle Eastern ethnic category should not be added to the minimum
standards.”224 Stunting these efforts, the OMB found the definition of
“Arab or Middle Eastern ethnicity [to be] problematic,” in addition to a
number of other justifications,225 which undergirded their negative
ruling.226
Arab American efforts continued in the early 2000s. These efforts,
however, shifted toward favoring a “MENA”—instead of a narrower
“Arab American”—box. The Census Bureau issued a statement in 2011
illustrating again its disfavor for a standalone Arab American box.227
As discussed supra in Part II.A, the ongoing efforts of Arab American
groups were stifled time and again, and the Census Bureau justified its
rejections on largely administrative grounds.228
The post-9/11 moment triggered newfound state interest in collecting
more precise and accurate demographic data about Arab Americans.
While some headway was made with regard to mitigating the discord
regarding the title, scope, structure, and phraseology of the proposed
MENA box, the State’s proffered justifications for dismissing earlier
requests remained relatively unchanged. What did change, however,
was internal government demand for clear and comprehensive
demographic data about Arab Americans, to facilitate the recent
remodeling of government anti-terrorism and national security policing
222. Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at 485.
223. See supra Part I.A.
224. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE INTERAGENCY COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RACIAL
AND ETHNIC STANDARDS TO THE OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET CONCERNING CHANGES TO
THE STANDARDS FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY, 62:131
FED. REGISTER 36874, 36940 (July 9, 1997).
225. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
226. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1300.
227. Id.
228. TEHRANIAN, supra note 8, at 169.
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from a federal to a decentralized law enforcement model that
emphasized “prevention” and centered “counter-radicalization” as the
anti-terror strategy du jour.229
2. After the War on Terror
The War on Terror, formally declared nine days after 9/11 and
enacted through the USA PATRIOT Act,230 proliferated state suspicion
and surveillance of Arab, MENA, and Muslim American
communities.231 The terrorist attacks also led to the creation of the
DHS,232 which brought forth radical reforms to the State’s immigration,
national security, and anti-terrorism policing programs.233
This
comprehensive restructuring of the State’s national security strategy and
structures was, in short, spurred by State policy that linked people of
apparent Arab ancestry to terrorism.234 The unprecedented antiterrorism policing powers held by the State would be indiscriminately
exercised against both foreign elements and citizens that fit within the
racial and religious profile of “terrorists.”235
Consequently, Arab Americans were disproportionately targeted by
NSA surveillance and profiling.236 Per se classification as white did not
insulate Arab Americans from broad sweeping surveillance and
policing, or extend any privileges that curbed state suspicion. As a
result, the “racial catch-22” that perplexed Arab Americans became
more pronounced. Following 9/11, more than any period before it,
Arab America found itself betwixt statutory whiteness and
sociopolitical pariah237—the latter status pushing Arab Americans
229. Akbar, supra note 13, at 810.
230. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
231. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
232. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 6, 18, 44, and 49 U.S.C.).
233. See Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 140.
234. Akram & Johnson, supra note 10, at 352.
235. Bush, supra note 156.
236. Akram & Johnson, supra note 10, at 327–30.
237. Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness, supra note 163, at 3.
Individuals of Middle Eastern descent are caught in a racial catch-22. Through a
bizarre fiction, the state has adopted the uniform and mandatory classification of all
individuals of Middle Eastern descent as white. On paper, therefore, they appear no
different than the blue-eyed, blonde-haired individual of Scandinavian descent. . . .
All the while, reality does not mesh with the bureaucratic characterizations of
Middle Eastern individuals as white. On the street, individuals of Middle Eastern
descent suffer from the types of discrimination and racial animus endured by
recognized minority groups. Middle Eastern individuals have endured increasing
levels of vilification and demonization in recent years, especially in the wake of the
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further away from the formal designation assigned by the OMB and the
Census Bureau, while simultaneously closer towards the presumptive
association with terrorism and radicalization. In short, DHS directives
mandating heightened surveillance of Arab Americans functioned as an
internal designation that the population was nonwhite or, in other
words, a demographic on which the State had to keep close tabs because
of its perceived nexus to terrorism.
Concomitantly, the OMB’s designation of Arab Americans as white
also compromises the efficacy of anti-terrorism surveillance and
policing. Since Arab Americans are per se white, their precise numbers,
concentrations, and whereabouts are unclear. Although the Census
Bureau previously shared demographic data about Arab Americans with
the DHS,238 the MENA box would facilitate compilation and collection
of more clear, comprehensive, and precise demographic data.239 Surely,
the State’s interest in accurate and finite demographic data about Arab
Americans increased considerably after the commencement of the War
on Terror, particularly with the recent paradigm shift from centralized
national security policing to local anti-terror law enforcement.240
Emergent counter-terrorism programming emphasizes “proactive
intelligence
gathering
and
‘forward
leaning’
prevention
prosecutions,”241 capabilities that would be markedly enhanced with the
availability of Arab American demographic macro- and mesodata.
CVE policing, discussed closely in the coming Part, is built upon the
philosophy of prevention, and stands as the next phase of national
security policing.
C. Converging State and Community Interests
In Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence
Dilemma, Derrick Bell observes how broader state interests may
materially drive moments of ostensible racial progress.242 Bell argues
that the landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education,243 the
war on terrorism and the 9/11 attacks.
Id.
238. Press Release, Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., ADC Presses Customs Border
Patrol (CBP) on Census Date (Aug. 13, 2004), http://adc.org/index.php?id=2303.
239. “[U]ltimate decisions on [census] questions reflect priorities concerning the desirability
of those policies and programs that eventually use census data.” Persily, supra note 164, at 758;
see also Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at 485.
240. See infra Part III.
241. Akbar, supra note 13, at 812.
242. Bell, supra note 27, at 525.
243. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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“Supreme Court’s most important statement on the principle of racial
equality,”244 was delivered as a “timely assertion” to advance American
foreign policy interests against its (then) rival hegemon, the Soviet
Union.245 The ruling in Brown, which converged with intensifying
American geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union over Third
World territories populated by black and brown people,246 functioned as
the “self-interest leverage” to carry forward the American foreign policy
agenda.247 Therefore, according to Bell, the declaration in Brown was
as much—if not more—about American hegemonic expansion as it was
about domestic racial integration.248
Converging state interests, both international and domestic, have
historically triggered or facilitated moments of apparent racial
progress.249 While popularly perceived as a marker and moment of
racial progress for Arab Americans, the adoption of the MENA category
would furnish federal and local law enforcement with currently
unavailable demographic data about the closely scrutinized population.
Much like the Brown ruling, extending a MENA box on the 2020 U.S.
census would appear to be a civil rights stride. While partly accurate,
this stride—upon closer investigation—may also signal state interests
converging with Arab American interests,250 by positioning the

244. Bell, supra note 27, at 525.
245. Id. at 524 (“‘[I]n many countries, where U.S. prestige and leadership have been damaged
by the fact of U.S. segregation, it will come as a timely reassertion of the basic American
principle that “all men are created equal.”‘“ (quoting Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An
Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 12 n.31 (1976))).
246. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988)
(“In the years following World War II, racial discrimination in the United States received
increasing attention from other countries. Newspapers throughout the world carried stories about
discrimination against non-white visiting foreign dignitaries, as well as against American blacks.
At a time when the U.S. hoped to reshape the postwar world in its own image, the international
attention given to racial segregation was troublesome and embarrassing. The focus of American
foreign policy at this point was to promote democracy and to ‘contain’ communism.”).
247. Bell, supra note 27, at 525.
248. Id.
249. Dudziak, supra note 246, at 68.
250. Bell, supra note 27, at 525; see also Beydoun, supra note 6, at 69–70 (examining the
alignment of state and Arab interests). An “interest convergence” moment also triggered the
ruling in Mohriez.
In line with renewed post-World War II foreign policy interests in the Arab World, the
naturalization of Arab Muslim immigrants promoted the broader project of enhancing
the United States’ profile in the Arab World. Extending citizenship to Muslim
immigrants grants from the Arab World, particularly those hailing from nations with
considerable value, made the United States a more attractive superpower with whom
governments of these countries could align during the Cold War. [Judge Charles
Wyzanski’s] plea for better relations between the United States and other nations
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standalone box as the self-interest leverage to extend the reach and
enhance the capacity of War on Terror surveillance and policing.251
Adoption of the MENA box on the 2020 census has the markings and
makings of an interest convergence moment. As outlined in Part II.A,
adoption of the MENA box in 2020 would advance numerous interests
for Arab Americans. However, the demographic macro- and mesodata
collected by a 2020 census that includes the MENA category, if availed
to the DHS and local law enforcement, could be perilous to the state of
Arab American civil liberties—First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment
concerns in particular.252 These detriments must be weighed against the
existential, political, legal, and economic benefits Arab Americans are
poised to gain if the MENA box, or another iteration of the proposed
category, is adopted in 2020.253
IV. DEMOGRAPHIC THREATS: CENSUS AND SURVEILLANCE
Nearly fifteen years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, national security
strategists in Washington, D.C. are thinking locally when it comes to
anti-terror policing. This emerging shift from centralized anti-terrorism
programming to community-oriented enforcement is in large part driven
by rising commitment to the countering violent extremism, or CVE,
model.254 This approach seeks to equip and empower local police
departments with the capability to monitor elements suspected of
“radicalization,” and during the protracted War on Terror, specifically
the radicalization of Arab, MENA, and Muslim American
populations.255
suggests that a reversal of Hassan, and an unprecedented expansion of whiteness to
include Arab Muslims, would facilitate stronger ties with newly independent Arab
countries.
Beydoun, supra note 6, at 69–70 (referring to the presiding judge in Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F.
Supp. 941 (D. Mass 1944)).
251. Aziz, supra note 157, at 151.
252. Mesodata provides “statistical results presented at such a fine level of geographic
disaggregation, whether in tabular or graphic form, that the results may be used in conducting
field operations at the local level.” Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at 485–86.
253. See supra Part II.A.
254. See Akbar, supra note 13, at 814 (“There is no singular, official, government-wide
understanding of radicalization. Indeed, more often than not, government officials and documents
refer to ‘radicalization,’ ‘radical’ and ‘radicalized’ Muslims, ‘radical Islam,’ ‘violent extremists,’
and so on, without explanation of what precisely these terms mean. Importantly, however, these
references assume causal connections between radicalism, extremism, Islam and terrorism.”).
255. Id.; see also SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, PREVENT STRATEGY (2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/preventstrategy-review.pdf [hereinafter PREVENT STRATEGY]. The United Kingdom was the first to
institute a formal counter-radicalization program, which it currently calls “CONTEST.” The
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In line with this philosophical swing from Capitol to communitybased anti-terror programming, the DHS has established new initiatives
that broaden its capacity to monitor subjects suspected of terrorism. In
conjunction with NSA surveillance, the CVE and SAR Programs add
robust local law enforcement dimensions to already expansive federal
policing capacities, effectively coupling the long arm of the police state
with an ever-present and emergent hand in community policing.256 This
anti-terrorism policing paradigm would be enhanced with access to
more accurate demographic data about Arab Americans, who are
conflated with Muslims257 and routinely linked with and suspected of
terrorism.258
This Part examines the principal federal and local anti-terrorism
policing programs that disproportionately target Arab, MENA, and
Muslim American communities. Section A examines NSA surveillance
powers, while Sections B and C analyze the emergent local policing
programs, CVE and SAR, respectively. Scrutiny of these three
programs will highlight how access to precise demographic macro- and
mesodata about the whereabouts of Arab Americans will expand their
reach and further erode the civil liberties of an already vulnerable
population.

Program was first developed in 2003 by the Home Office Department of the British Government,
and is looked to as a model for CVE programming in the US and other European nations. See
generally PREVENT STRATEGY, supra.
256. See AAI Letter to the U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 161, at 3 (“This population [Arab
Americans] remains concerned about civil liberties violations especially with increased
infiltration by some federal and state security agents into community institutions.”); see also
Amna A. Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834 (2015) (analyzing
how CVE adopts the strategy of community policing).
257. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 37–38 (“There is little doubt today that many Americans still
conflate Arab American and Muslim American identity. The stereotype that ‘all Arabs [are]
Muslims—[and] all Muslims [are] Arabs,’ is a pervasive one in the United States today.
‘[D]espite deep demographic, religious, and other differences between the two groups, both Arabs
and Muslims have become the target of popular suspicion, resulting in the “Arabification” of
Muslims, and the “Muslimification” of Arabs.’ 9/11 intensified this conflation, and converted
Muslim American identity into a racial classification understood in the narrow image of Arab
Americans.” (alterations in original) (quoting Debra Merskin, The Construction of Arabs as
Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush, 7 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 157, 165
(2004); and Reem Bahdi, No Exit: Racial Profiling and Canada’s War Against Terrorism, 41
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 293, 296 (2003))); see also Merskin, supra.
258. Ahmad, supra note 9, at 1278 (“The logic of governmental profiling is only slightly more
nuanced: (1) because all of the September 11 terrorists were Arab and Muslim; (2) because most
Arabs are Muslims; and (3) because the terrorists claim religious motivation for their actions; (4)
all Arabs and all Muslims are likely to be terrorists.”).

15_BEYDOUN FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

736

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

3/31/2016 5:57 PM

[Vol. 47

A. National Security Agency (“NSA”) Surveillance
NSA surveillance forms the monitoring foundation of the State’s
anti-terror and counter-radicalization strategies. Among the marked
reforms that followed 9/11 was reformation of the Foreign Intelligence
and Surveillance Act (“FISA”), which was enacted in 1978 to equip the
state with the authority to collect “foreign intelligence information”
between “foreign powers” and their domestic “agents.”259 Before the
USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA in 2001,260 FISA required a
government agent to receive a warrant from a specialized “FISA Court”
before a wiretap was legally issued.261 Through broad exercise of his
executive powers, President George W. Bush overhauled FISA’s legal
framework, with dissolution of the FISA Court standing as the most
drastic, and critiqued, reform.262
The post-9/11 FISA amendments spawned the Terrorist Surveillance
Program (“TSP”). The TSP equipped the NSA with the means to
intercept “communications between individuals on American soil and
individuals abroad, without judicial approval.”263 By sidestepping the
FISA Court, the TSP eliminated the lone buffer between NSA agents
and their targets. Following reform, the NSA currently holds wide and
almost unchecked authority to use wiretaps on subjects it suspects of
terrorism.264 In addition to monitoring targets, a “data mining
component” of the TSP offers agents with the capability to monitor the
private communications of not only the target, but also the
communications of third parties.265 Therefore, the TSP not only
threatens the civil liberties of the target—particularly core First and
Fourth Amendment speech and privacy rights—but those of individuals
in collateral proximity to the target.

259. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c)
(2012).
260. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
261. The specialized FISA Court is dubbed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(“FISC”), which extended (or denied) the issuance of wiretaps permitting surveillance of a
target’s communications.
262. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“Commander in Chief Clause”). A broad host of critics,
including civil rights advocates, politicians, and law scholars, critiqued President Bush’s exercise
of the Commander in Chief Clause as strident, and in many instances, illegal.
263. Katherine L. Wong, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
517, 517 (2006).
264. Id. at 519 (“Unlike targets of surveillance conducted under FISA, the targets of the
terrorist surveillance program may be chosen by the ‘operational work force’ at the NSA and
approved by a shift supervisor.”).
265. Kadidal, supra note 32, at 4.
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Furthermore, the TSP effectively dissolved the legal distinction
between international and domestic communications. FISA, in its
original form, mandated that wiretapping capture only communications
between a foreign power and a domestic agent.266 Under the TSP,
“neither government assurances nor a requirement that the calls be
international in nature has prevented the terrorist surveillance program
from capturing purely domestic conversations.”267 This amendment to
FISA has proven extremely dangerous to U.S. citizens, specifically
Arab, MENA, and Muslim Americans, because the State links these
groups to terrorism.
TSP surveillance disproportionately targets Arab, MENA, and
Muslim Americans: “A complex matrix of ‘otherness’ based on race,
national origin, religion, culture, and political ideology may contribute
to the ferocity of the U.S. government’s attacks on the civil rights of
Arabs and Muslims.”268 The State’s “ferocious” targeting of Arab and
Muslim Americans was, in part, facilitated by vague definitions of
“terrorism.”269 The ambiguity and “excessively overbroad” definitions
of terrorism furnish the DHS with wide discretion over what activities
could be framed as potential terrorist enterprises.270 Oftentimes, merely
being Arab or Muslim American justifies surveillance. While the
efficacy of the TSP, and post-9/11 racial profiling strategies at large,
have been subjects of heated debate within and outside of legal
scholarship,271 disparate surveillance of Arab, MENA, and Muslim
American communities still stands as a cornerstone of anti-terror
policing.

266. FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c) (2012).
267. Wong, supra note 263, at 519.
268. Akram & Johnson, supra note 10, at 299.
269. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1965, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012) (outlining the
definition of distinct terrorist activities); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (5) (2012) (defining “domestic
terrorism” as activities that: “involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”).
270. Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 140, at 1385.
271. See generally Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes & Tara L. Quinlan, Defining Racial
Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195 (2003) (contending that
post-9/11 racial profiling is ineffective because it curbs focus on more pressing areas of national
security and criminal investigation). For an opposing view, see Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial
Profiling and Terrorism, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 337, 343 (2003), which
highlights the national security benefits of a racial profiling-oriented anti-terror policing regime.
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B. Countering Violent Extremism (“CVE”)
“Countering-Violent Extremism,” “Counter-Radicalization,”272 and
“Counterterrorism Community Policing”273: these phrases not only
characterize the emergent anti-terrorism parlance in the U.S., but also
define the new paradigm and strategy of national security policing.
CVE, modeled after the British “CONTEST” anti-radicalization
program installed in 2003,274 centers its approach on identifying
individuals with a propensity for terrorism, and preventing them from
committing an act of terror.
Information gathering and sharing is a central component of CVE
policing. In addition to equipping local police departments with broad
surveillance powers previously held by only the DHS, CVE also,
“promote[s] information sharing and collaboration between Federal,
State, Local, Territorial, Tribal, Private, Civilian and International
entities working to counter the threat of violent extremism.”275 Coupled
with a strategic shift in policing, CVE specifically targets domestic
terrorists, namely, American citizens: “The turn to counterradicalization reflects an appreciation that the contemporary terrorist
threat includes a ‘homegrown’ dimension, which in turn necessitates a
domestic preventive approach.”276 President Obama affirmed that the
success of CVE hinges on Muslim American support, stating, “Muslim
leaders need to do more to discredit the notion that our nations are
determined to suppress Islam,” suggesting that Muslim Americans must
also be part of the campaign of identifying and preventing terrorism.277
The meaning and scope of CVE or counter-radicalization, synonyms
both used by the state, are still ambiguous and underdeveloped. Law
272. Although this article adopts CVE as the title of choice, many names have been used for
the policing program. In National Security’s Broken Windows, Akbar states, “[r]adicalization and
counterradicalization have become the language of prevention in national security law,”
highlighting the program’s several titles within law enforcement and policy discourse. Akbar,
supra note 256, at 849.
273. Aziz, supra note 157, at 151 (“[C]ounterterrorism community policing (‘CCP’), is not,
nor is it intended to be, the same as community policing in the traditional criminal context. Rather
than fundamentally changing relations between law enforcement and communities into a
partnership, CCP perpetuates preventative counterterrorism strategies that prioritize surveillance,
investigation, prosecution, and conviction of Muslims.”).
274. See PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 255.
275. Countering Violent Extremism, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/
topic/countering-violent-extremism (last updated Oct. 14, 2015).
276. Rascoff, supra note 15, at 128–29.
277. Julia Edwards, Obama: Countering Violent Extremism Depends on Muslim Support,
REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/18/us-usa-security-obamaidUSKBN0LM2B920150218.
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scholar Samuel J. Rascoff observes:
Unlike “counterterrorism” or “counterinsurgency,” which have rich (if
not entirely satisfying) conceptual foundations, “counterradicalization” remains almost completely undertheorized. To its
proponents, counterradicalization begins with the uncontroversial
proposition that manifestations of violent extremism are rooted in
ideas and social-behavioral processes. Understanding and addressing
those ideas and processes will help prevent future attacks and thus
should play an important role in American counterterrorism policy.
But these basic assumptions give rise to a wide range of theoretical
possibilities about what counter-radicalization is, how it should be
conducted, and how the government can best devote its resources to
address the contemporary security threat.278

CVE is, per its name, committed to identifying “violent extremists,”
defined as “individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated
violence to further political goals.”279 Extending the reach of NSA
surveillance powers, CVE operates in the communities considered
havens for “Homegrown Violent Extremists,” or HVEs.280 Despite its
conceptual and structural ambiguity, the DHS,281 Congress,282 and the
White House have been unambiguous in their support for CVE.283

278. Rascoff, supra note 15, at 137.
279. Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 275.
280. Id. (defining an HVE as: “A person of any citizenship who has lived or operated
primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to
engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing material support to
terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a terrorist organization, but
who is acting independently of direction by a terrorist organization.”).
281. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, A TICKING
TIME BOMB: COUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO
PREVENT THE FORT HOOD ATTACK 17 (2011).
282. Akbar, supra note 13, at 821 (“In Congress, for example, both the House and Senate
Homeland Security Committees have devoted considerable resources to the development of the
radicalization discourse, emphasizing the need for the government to monitor and respond to
radicalization.”).
283. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2011). An Executive Order established the
Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, comprised of government personnel and
stakeholders. The White House held a “CVE Summit in February 2015,” which was opposed by
nine major civil rights and advocacy organizations, including ADC and the Arab American
Association of New York. See Arab-Am. Anti-Discrimination Comm., et al., Joint Statement
Regarding Upcoming Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://www.adc.org/fileadmin/ADC/Pdfs/Joint_Statement_Regarding_Summit_on_Countering_V
iolent_Extremism__CVE_.pdf. But see also Ali Jakvani, On the Ground in LA and as a Delegate
to CVE, ISLAMIC MONTHLY (Mar. 11, 2015), http://theislamicmonthly.com/on-the-ground-in-laand-as-a-delegate-to-cve/ (supporting CVE, from a Muslim American delegate who attended the
CVE Summit at the White House).
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CVE, which dedicates much of its resources to Muslims, 284 and
disproportionately targets indigent and working class Muslim
Americans in concentrated, urban enclaves,285 is “cloaked in expertise
about the process by which Muslims become terrorists.”286 An FBI
Intelligence Assessment, The Radicalization Process: From Conversion
to Jihad, frames the current CVE structure287: “[A] predictable process
by which a Muslim becomes a terrorist,” broken down into four stages:
“‘preradicalization,’ ‘identification,’ ‘indoctrination,’ and ‘action.’”288
Linking radicalization to a range of factors, including Islamic
identity, degree of religiosity, and political viewpoints, CVE is acutely
and disparately threatening to observant Muslim Americans,289
particularly those transitioning from secular to devout lifestyles or
members of the community holding “critical politics.”290 Therefore, the
potential impact on the First Amendment free exercise, speech, and
assembly rights of Muslim Americans are considerable. In addition,
CVE exposes Arab Americans at large, whether Muslim or Christian, to
CVE surveillance, as Arab identity is conflated with, and sometimes
believed to be synonymous with, Muslim identity.
Collaborating with entities having established community ties in
Arab, MENA, and Muslim American communities is core to the CVE
strategy.291 In addition to tapping individual informants, building
284. Akbar, supra note 13, at 819–20 (“Radicalization and counter-radicalization programs
are primarily if not almost exclusively concerned with Muslim communities.”); see also Junaid
Sulahry, Countering Violent Extremism, MUSLIM ADVOCATES (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.
muslimadvocates.org/cve-countering-violent-extremism/ (stating, in a formal position from one
of the leading Muslim American civil rights and legal defense organizations in the United States,
that CVE creates “the false perception [that] sends a dangerous signal to members of the public
that their Muslim neighbors are a threat, worsening the environment of anti-Muslim bigotry and
hate crimes”).
285. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia and Erasure: Poor
and Muslim in “War on Terror” America, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), for an
analysis of CVE policing’s strategic deployment in concentrated urban enclaves, which are hubs
for indigent and working-class Muslim American communities, and the intensified impact CVE
has on these communities’ First and Fourth Amendment rights.
286. Akbar, supra note 13, at 817.
287. FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: FROM CONVERSION TO
JIHAD 1–2 (2006), http://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf (confidential report leaked to the public).
288. Akbar, supra note 13, at 820.
289. “Muslim religious practice—core First Amendment activity, unconnected to any
suspicion of criminal activity—becomes a predictor for criminality.” Id. at 835.
290. “Radicalization’s concern is predicated on a false belief in the teleological character of
Islam—that if Muslim communities witness conservative religious practice and critical politics,
they will view such currents as acceptable and gravitate toward radicalism.” Akbar, supra note
256, at 877.
291. “Support Local Communities—Bolster efforts to catalyze and support community-based
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strategic alliances with advocacy, cultural, and religious organizations is
core to the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) furtherance of CVE
strategy.292 These community elements equip law enforcement with
on-the-ground allies and watchdogs, but more importantly, the
legitimacy that only native informants can provide.293 CVE community
engagement centers on “mosques, community institutions, and youth in
Muslim communities,”294 with a disproportionate focus on
concentrated, indigent, and working-class Muslim American
enclaves.295
In Los Angeles, one of CVE’s three pilot cities,296 the Los Angeles
Police Department (“LAPD”) works closely with the Muslim Public
Affairs Council (“MPAC”). To promote CVE aims, MPAC launched
the “Safe Spaces Program,” which encourages its employees and
community partners to take on the role of identifying “radicals” within
the Muslim American community. In addition, MPAC provides the
LAPD with access to other civil society organizations within the Arab,
MENA, and Muslim American community, including “Muslim student
groups and mosques.”297
More precise and comprehensive data about Arab, MENA, and
Muslim Americans would bolster CVE strategy. As a first step, the
MENA box facilitates the gathering of macrodata that specifically
outlines the precise whereabouts of MENA individuals and families. In
programs, and strengthen relationships with communities that may be targeted for recruitment by
violent extremists.” Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 275.
292. “DOJ engages in extensive community engagement efforts through many of its offices
and divisions. DOJ’s community engagement efforts have included its Community Relation’s
Service (CRS), Civil Rights Division, U.S. Attorneys’ offices, and Office of Justice Programs.”
Akbar, supra note 256, at 859.
293. “The way the Los Angeles Police Department’s counterterrorism head Michael Downing
sees it, American Muslims could be the city’s most effective tool in guarding against homeland
threats by the violent extremist group known as the Islamic State.” Brenda Gazzar, Los Angeles
Picked for Pilot Program to Counter Homegrown Jihadists, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20140923/los-angeles-picked-for-pilot-program-tocounter-homegrown-jihadists.
294. Akbar, supra note 256, at 843.
295. See Beydoun, supra note 285.
296. Brian Bennett, Joel Rubin & Victoria Kim, L.A. Chosen for Pilot Program on
Dissuading Militant Recruits, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-meterror-jihad-program-20140923-story.html. Boston and Minneapolis were the other two cities
chosen by the White House to launch pilot CVE programs. See also Samantha Masunaga,
Homeland Security Head Aims to Build Trust in L.A. Muslim Community, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 12,
2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-1114-mosque-visit-20141114-story.html.
297. Staff, MPAC Joins LAPD in Answering Community Questions, MUSLIM PUB. AFF.
COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.mpac.org/programs/government-relations/mpac-joins-lapdin-answering-community-questions.php.
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addition, the structure of the proposed designation will also lead to the
production of mesodata, based on an algorithm that takes into
consideration surname, nationality, geographic designation, socioeconomic status, and the faith and religious sect of the individual,
thereby furnishing police departments carrying forward CVE strategy
with the ability to hone their focus on specific subsets of the Arab
American population they deem disposed to radicalization or terrorism.
Although CVE has garnered some support from civil society elements,
most notably MPAC, many Arab, MENA, and Muslim Americans “fear
it is profiling disguised as prevention and worry it could compromise
civil liberties and religious freedoms.”298
C. Suspicious Activity Reporting (“SAR”)
Suspicious Activity Reporting, or SAR, is another facet of the State’s
broader War on Terror capabilities. The model, which was made into a
formal law enforcement program known as the Nationwide Suspicion
Initiative (“NSI”), is:
[A] joint collaborative effort by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and state, local, tribal,
and territorial law enforcement partners. This initiative provides law
enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism and other
related criminal activity by establishing a national capacity for
gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing SAR
information.299

Following the structural and strategic modeling of CVE, NSI
combines the policing powers of federal policing agencies (DHS and
FBI) with the law enforcement capabilities and community ties of local
police departments.
NSI also relies heavily on the proactive reporting of private citizens.
Federal and local law enforcement rely upon private citizens to report
“[s]uspicious activities that can help prevent violent crimes or terrorists
attacks.”300 In reporting suspicious activity and subjects, the DHS
298. Tami Abdollah & Philip Marcelo, “It Sets People Off”: Some Muslims See Profiling in
U.S. Anti-Terror Program, NBC L.A. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/
Obama-Muslims-Countering-Violent-Extremism-SoCal-civil-liberties-300678641.html; see also
Margari A. Hill, Logging it All: CVE and Schisms in the Muslim American Community, ISLAMIC
MONTHLY (Mar. 4, 2015), http://theislamicmonthly.com/logging-it-all-cve-and-schisms-in-themuslim-community (highlighting the debates and divisions with the Muslim American population
regarding CVE).
299. The Nationwide SAR Initiative, supra note 34.
300. Report Suspicious Activity, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (“If you see suspicious
activity, please report it to your local police department. Local law enforcement officers can
respond quickly. Once they assess the situation, they can obtain additional support [inferring that
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issues broad directives to prospective parties reporting the activity,
which includes: “a brief description of the activity; [d]ate, time, and
location of the activity; [p]hysical identifiers of anyone you observed,
[d]escriptions of Vehicles; and [i]nformation about where people
involved in suspicious activities may have gone.”301
NSI functions in tandem with CVE. Although a precursor program,
NSI can be viewed as the private arm of CVE, equipping citizens and
civil society elements with the capacity to report suspicious behavior.
More than a reactive program, SAR, combined with CVE strategy, also
functions proactively. Police departments with CVE programs, such as
those in Boston, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles, can tap private
informants to function as perpetual watchdogs in Arab, MENA, and
Muslim American communities. In addition to individual informants,
police departments will also designate organizations as institutional
informants. Again, the LAPD’s relationship with MPAC is a staple
example of the institutional informant role.302
V. THE DARK SIDE OF CENSUS REFORM
The public discourse surrounding the proposed MENA box to the
2020 U.S. census has been overwhelmingly celebratory.303 Based on
past and present community mobilization for reform and
reclassification, the proposed MENA box would be “well received by
the majority of the Arab American community.”304 As the Census
Bureau and community stakeholders continue to discuss the title,
parameters, and language of the proposed classification, the State’s
post-9/11 pivot toward reform and reclassification of Arab American
identity is, in and of itself, regarded as a moment of racial progress.
Abed Ayoub, Legal Director of the ADC in Washington, D.C., captured
the general sentiment held by community leaders and stakeholders
working toward reclassification: “The proposed box, and recent
meetings, foreshadows a genuine commitment by the Census Bureau to
DHS and FBI personnel can be called upon].”).
301. Id.
302. Gazzar, supra note 293.
303. Tanzina Vega, Census Considers How to Measure a More Diverse America, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/us/census-bureau-arabs-hispanics-diversity.
html; see also Teresa Wiltz, Lobbying For a ‘MENA’ Category on U.S. Census, USA TODAY
(Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/13/stateline-census-menaafrica-mideast/13999239.
304. Samer Hijazi, U.S. Census Sets Goals to Expand on Ethnic Categories, Including Arabs,
ARAB AM. NEWS (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/news/id_5891/U-SCensus-sets-goals-to-expand-on-ethnic-categories,-including-Arabs-.html.
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resolve the longstanding Arab American racial dilemma.
A
305
considerable change from decades of denial and dismissal.”
This moment of converging community and state interests intersects
with broadening state surveillance and suspicion of Arab, MENA, and
Muslim American communities. As discussed in Part II.C, modern civil
rights history reveals that marked shifts in state policy are driven more
by majoritarian interests than minority demands. 306 Viewed within the
context of the expanding police state and the sharing of federal national
security policing powers with local law enforcement, closer scrutiny of
this perceived moment of Arab American racial progress reveals a host
of underlying perils.307
This Part analyzes the most concerning ramifications that the
proposed reform poses to Arab Americans. Section A examines how
the proposed MENA box will facilitate War on Terror policing,
particularly CVE strategy, which, in turn, will chill constitutionally
protected activity and further curb the civil liberties of Arab Americans.
Section B analyzes how identifying as white or MENA during the War
on Terror also functions as a mode of political speech that exposes those
who choose the latter with enhanced vulnerability to state surveillance,
profiling, and policing. Finally, Section C highlights how divergent
modes of identification within the Arab American community will
result in a population divided between two racial groups—MENA and
white.
A. Augmenting Anti-Terror Surveillance and Policing
1. MENA Demographic Data
In the Dark Side of Numbers: The Role of Population Data Systems
and Human Rights Abuses, William Seltzer and Margo Anderson
conclude, “[p]opulation data systems also permit the identification of
vulnerable subpopulations within the larger population, or even the
definition of entire populations as ‘outcast’ and a threat to the overall
health of the state.”308 Therefore, while the census’s core functions
include determining the scope of its polity for military conscription,
305. Interview of Abed Ayoub, Legal & Policy Dir., Arab Am. Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 3, 2015).
306. Bell, supra note 27, at 525.
307. For a brief synopsis of the surveillance perils the MENA box, if adopted, will facilitate
for Arab and Muslim Americans, see generally Khaled A. Beydoun, A Demographic Threat?
Proposed Reclassification of Arab Americans on the 2020 Census, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 1 (2015).
308. Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at 482.
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voting, distribution of resources, and taxation purposes,309 Seltzer and
Anderson unveil the State’s past record and its propensity to identify
and isolate subsets of the polity deemed threatening to national
security.310 In short, the Census Bureau has previously shared
demographic data, which it was commissioned to collect and compile
for politically neutral ends, for policing and punitive aims.
While a racial profile linking Arab identity to national security threats
preceded 9/11,311 the terrorist attacks of that day ushered in sweeping
legislation and ignited societal animus that targeted Arab Americans,
markedly enhancing the vulnerability of Arab Americans to both
“private” and “public” violence:
Two forms of racial violence swept across the United States in
the aftermath of September 11. The first involved what
traditionally would be classified as private violence: violence
enacted by one (or more) private actor upon another, without
direct state participation. The thousands of physical attacks
carried out by individuals against Arabs, Muslims, and South
Asians after the terrorist attacks typify this. The second form of
violence is traditionally deemed public, because of the direct
involvement of state actors. After September 11, this took the
form of a broad range of governmental policies that targeted
“Muslim-looking” people.312
Nearly a decade and a half after 9/11, “private” and “public” violence
toward Arab Americans continues to escalate.313 Embedded “American
Orientalism”314 and the rising tide of “Islamophobia”315 exposes Arab,
309. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
310. Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at 482; see also Steven A. Holmes, Report Says
Census Bureau Helped Relocate Japanese, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2000), http://www.nytimes.
com/2000/03/17/us/report-says-census-bureau-helped-relocate-japanese.html?pagewanted=print
(“[T]he Census Bureau was deeply involved in the roundup and internment of JapaneseAmericans at the onset of American entry into World War II.”).
311. Ahmad, supra note 9, at 1271 n.36; Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two
Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999).
312. Ahmad, supra note 9, at 1265.
313. See generally Beydoun, supra note 202.
314. Here, I use “American Orientalism” to refer to the distinctly American view of Islam and
the “Muslim World” that began to take shape in the eighteenth century. This is not to be
mistaken with how the term has been deployed more recently by other scholars, most notably
Douglas Little, who uses “American Orientalism” as a governmental view of the Middle East that
began to take shape after 1945. See generally DOUGLAS LITTLE, AMERICAN ORIENTALISM: THE
UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945 (3rd ed. 2008).
315. I define “Islamophobia” as animus toward Islam, Muslims, and individuals stereotyped
as Muslims. See also CARL W. ERNST, ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF
INTOLERANCE 2 (2013) (defining “Islamophobia”); HAMID DABASHI, BROWN SKIN, WHITE
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MENA, and Muslim Americans, and communities linked to these
groups,316 to greater danger. Moreover, enhanced NSA surveillance
and the emergence of CVE and SAR policing further subject Arab
American bodies—citizens and communities alike—to more exacting
state scrutiny.317 Therefore, Arab Americans are a subset of the
American polity that Seltzer and Anderson would identify as
“vulnerable” to the extra-legal use of demographic data collected by the
U.S. census.
The adoption of the MENA box in 2020 would lead to the collection
and compilation of more accurate and nuanced demographic data on
Arab Americans. In addition to “macrodata,”318 which is made publicly
available, the MENA box will produce an unprecedented stock of
precise and detailed “mesodata.”319
Mesodata provides “statistical results presented at such a fine level of
geographic disaggregation, whether in tabular or graphic form, that the
results may be used in conducting field operations at the local level.”320
Aligning with the structural and strategic character of CVE and SAR,
which are anti-terrorism “field operations at the local level,”321 law
enforcement that procures MENA-focused mesodata stands to threaten
applicants that check MENA in tightly concentrated Arab American
communities, like Detroit or New York City, 322 as well as areas of the
MASKS 9–12 (2010) (analyzing the “making of Islamophobia” in an interdisciplinary setting).
See generally EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS
DETERMINE HOW WE SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD (1981) (analyzing how the media and
political actors manufacture misrepresentations of Islam, Muslims, and the Muslim World, in
what is widely considered the landmark analysis).
316. Wajahat Ali identifies groups phenotypically associated with Muslim identity as looking
“Muslim-y,” such as Arab American Christians, Iranian Jews and Sikh Americans. Wajahat Ali,
Wade
Michael
Paige:
Islamophobia
Unleashed,
SALON
(Aug.
7,
2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/08/07/wade_michael_page_islamophobia_unleashed.
317. “Radicalization has transformed the project of counterterrorism intelligence gathering
into one squarely focused on gathering as much information as possible about Muslim life in the
United States, with a particular emphasis on political and religious cultures of Muslim [and Arab
American] communities.” Akbar, supra note 13, at 845.
318. Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at 485 (“Macrodata refer[s] to statistical tabulations,
or related graphics, for countries, provinces or states, counties or governments, and moderate to
large urban agglomerations. Such tabulations, while important for policymaking, propaganda,
and general administrative purposes, usually have limited value in planning or carrying out the
operation aspects of a major human [or civil] rights abuse.”).
319. Id.
320. Id. “Thus the line between macrodata and mesodata will depend in part on the size of the
geographic units, the distribution of the target population among these units, and the intended
operational uses.” Id.
321. Id.
322. Brown et al., supra note 84, at 1.
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country where the population of Arab Americans is sparse. Although
demographic mesodata is highly confidential, private companies—for
instance, Lockheed Martin after the 2010 census—have contracted with
the government to assist in data processing of this information.323
Indicating that private actors, subcontracted to process the data,
therefore, have access to the underlying statistics compiled by the U.S.
census. This access creates the possibility of confidential demographic
data being viewed, and possibly used, by other government agencies
and, potentially, non-state actors.
A standalone census box that includes Arab Americans would
facilitate more exacting CVE surveillance and monitoring. The U.S.
Census Bureau proposal encourages applicants to write in their
“ethnicity or nationality.”324 This additional component of the
proposed MENA box will furnish state agencies, including the DHS and
local law enforcement departments, with more specific demographical
data about different subsets of the broader MENA population.
For instance, if the DHS considers Iraqi Americans to be a subgroup
of greater national security concern, the proposed MENA category may
provide the DHS with previously unavailable macro- and mesodata on
this subgroup. This data would bolster DHS strategy by, first,
furnishing it with clearer targets, and, second, giving it the ability to
prudently commit resources to CVE programming in American cities
and communities with concentrated subgroups disparately suspected of
terrorism and linked to radicalization. From the vantage point of the
State, more accurate and nuanced information of both Arab Americans
at large and subgroups of interest would markedly expand and increase
the efficiency of federal and local anti-terrorism efforts.
2. Sharpening Counter-Terrorism Tactics
The availability of Arab American demographic macro- and
mesodata would enhance CVE policing strategy and tactics. First, it
carries “mapping” strategy forward. Mapping is the process by which
law enforcement “prepare[s] maps identifying neighborhoods where
certain immigrants [or ethnic groups] predominate.”325 More accurate
and comprehensive demographic data about Arab Americans would
equip federal and local law enforcement to pinpoint not only broader
323. Bhatnagar, supra note 36, at 86 (describing a $500 million contract that Lockheed Martin
signed with the Census Bureau in 2010 because the government agency was “unable to bear the
burden of conducting the census alone”).
324. 2015 Census Update, supra note 17, at 17.
325. Akbar, supra note 13, at 855 n.176.
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cities, but even map communities, neighborhoods, blocks, and
households with ties to a terror or radical suspect.
Second, enhanced demographic data produced by the MENA box
narrows the pool of Arab Americans who may be called on for
“voluntary interviews”—another core tactic of CVE policing. Again,
Arab Americans who identify along political or religious terms on the
census may be called in for a voluntary interview,326 also known as
“knock and talks.”327 Agents may approach subjects of interest at their
homes, mosques, places of employment, community centers, or even on
the street. Further, DHS officers may be able to decipher the religious
or sectarian identity of a subject based on his or her last name or
responses to other questions on the U.S. census form, which provide
contextual data.
Third, more finite demographic data will guide the use of government
informants. Although not standard practice, the DHS and local police
sometimes use coercive tactics compelling individuals—particularly
those indigenous to the very communities they are asked to monitor—to
assume the role as an informant. Through an integrated CVE and NSI
policing strategy, police departments will tap both institutional and
individual informants in strategic communities to function as de facto
counter-radicalization police. This strategy is already taking place in
Los Angeles, as illustrated by the formal collaboration between the
LAPD and MPAC.328
Fourth, macro- and mesodata availed by the MENA box will deepen
the outreach and engagement tentacles of CVE community engagement.
As discussed in Part III.B, collaborating with Arab, MENA, and
Muslim American civil society actors is central to CVE’s success.
Community engagement has become a cornerstone of national security
policing and specifically of counter-radicalization efforts.329 More
accurate and comprehensive demographic data will enable federal and
local law enforcement to share names of interest with community
partners, who may then be commissioned to serve as CVE informants.
“Put simply, community policing co-opts Muslim community leaders
into gathering and sharing intelligence on Muslims’ political beliefs,
religious practices, and other information otherwise unavailable to law
326. Id. at 859.
327. See generally Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and
Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 41 (2011) (analyzing the due process and free
speech encroachments posed by knock-and-talk interviews).
328. Gazzar, supra note 293.
329. See Akbar, supra note 256.
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enforcement due to constitutional constraints.”330
Fifth, surveillance of Internet communication becomes more
expansive and intrusive with the availability of precise MENA-related
demographic data. The more precise and comprehensive demographic
data availed by the MENA box, particularly the finite mesodata, will
furnish federal and local law enforcement with zip code and household
specific information. Therefore, law enforcement can wire and monitor
the private Internet communication of individuals suspected of
radicalization, or in the process of being radicalized.
3. Pernicious Precedents
Precedent establishes that the Census Bureau is likely to share
statistical data with other government agencies, including the DHS.331
This is particularly true during times of national security crisis. The
most vivid example of the Census Bureau’s interagency data sharing
was the sharing of demographic data on Japanese Americans on the
West Coast with the U.S. military, following Japan’s bombing of Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941.332 To carry forward the forced migration
and internment of Japanese Americans, the Census Bureau shared both
macro- and mesodata with the military:
The Census Bureau also gave direct assistance to the military
authorities on the West Coast by: providing tract-level tabulations of
Japanese Americans from the 1940 Census in January 1942 . . .
making available census-block maps showing the number of Japanese
American enumerated as residing in each block . . . .333

In addition to the fear of “[t]he precedent and prospect of
internment,” the intergovernmental sharing of census data—particularly
following the prospective adoption of the MENA category—poses a
range of immediate civil liberties concerns for Arab Americans. This is
especially true after moments of national crisis, where national security
330. Aziz, supra note 134, at 150.
331. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1313 (“The CB [Census Bureau] became implicated in this
racial profiling when it was revealed that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requested,
and was given, tabulations of publicly available census data on Arab Americans by ZIP code.”).
332. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (affirming an order excluding and
interning persons of Japanese ancestry from parts of the West Coast); see also ROGER DANIELS,
CONCENTRATION CAMPS NORTH AMERICA: JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
DURING WORLD WAR II (1993); Saito, supra note 139; Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at
492.
333. Seltzer & Anderson, supra note 37, at 492 (“The [B]ureau has denied the charge and no
definitive evidence to the contrary has emerged. Nevertheless, there now seems to be general
agreement that the provision of mesodata and professional expertise violated the spirit, if not the
letter, of the promises embodied in the census confidentiality laws.”).
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concerns and the Executive’s war power will set aside legal restrictions
against disclosure of confidential data.334
A more recent precedent involving Arab Americans also foreshadows
potential misuse of demographic data collected through the MENA box.
In July 30, 2004, the New York Times revealed that the Census Bureau
“[p]rovided specially tabulated population statistics on Arab-Americans
to the Department of Homeland Security, including detailed information
on how many people of Arab backgrounds live in certain ZIP codes.”335
Census Bureau officials shared this data with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”), the agency responsible for monitoring the U.S.’s
border checkpoints.336 The first tabulation outlined the specific number
of Arab Americans in 159 American cities with “1,000 or more persons
of Arab ancestry.”337
In addition to the first file, the Census Bureau also disclosed a second
file with more nuanced data. The second table broke down the Arab
American population in over 500 zip codes by seven nationalities
(Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, Moroccan, Palestinian, and
Syrian) and two general categories (“Arab/Arabic” and “Other
Arab”).338 “File 3,”339 the name of the second more specific tabulation,
highlights the type of macrodata that would be compiled—in even more
accurate and multilayered form—by the proposed MENA classification.
Civil rights advocates viewed the interagency sharing of this data with
great suspicion, linking the DHS’s possession of the internal U.S.

334. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
335. Lynette Clemetson, Homeland Security Given Data on Arab-Americans, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/30/us/homeland-security-given-data-on-arabamericans.html.
336. Department of Homeland Security Obtained on Arab Americans From Census Bureau,
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (EPIC), https://epic.org/privacy/census/foia/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2016) [hereinafter EPIC Report] (“The heavily redacted documents show that in April 2004, a
Census Bureau analyst e-mailed a department of Homeland Security official and said, ‘You got a
file of Arab ancestry information by Zip Code Tabulation Area from me last December (2003).
My superiors are now asking about the usage of that data, given the sensitivity of different data
requests we have receive about the Arab population.”); see also Eric Lipton, Panel Says Census
Move on Arab-Americans Recalls World War II Internments, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/10/politics/10census.html?pagewanted=print&position
(discussing the U.S. Census Bureau’s sharing of internal Arab American demographic data with
the DHS in 2004).
337. CENSUS 2000 DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE tbl.DP-2 (2000), https://epic.org/privacy/census/
foia/tab_1.pdf (“Places With 10,000 or More Population and With 1,000 or More Persons of Arab
Ancestry: 2000”).
338. CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY FILE 3, tbls.PCT16 & PCT17, https://epic.org/privacy/census/
foia/tab_2.pdf (“People of Arab Ancestry by Zip Code Tabulation Area: 2000”).
339. Id.
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census figures with the rounding up and deportation of Arab
Americans.340
Christiana Halsey, a spokeswoman for the CBP, denied claims that
the demographic data was being used for surveillance purposes.341
More tellingly, Hermann Habermann, then Deputy Director of the
Census Bureau, voiced concern: “We do worry about how information
will be used. However, we have not been given the authority to
determine which organization gets which information.”342
Habermann’s admission indicates the Census Bureau itself may be
opposed to interagency sharing of the demographic data. But as a
consequence of extra-agency need or compulsion,343 particularly for
data branded sensitive or essential for carrying forward national security
interests, the Census Bureau itself may be politically pressured to hand
over the data it collects. Both historic and contemporary precedent
highlight the probable sharing and misuse of privileged demographic
data that would be collected and compiled through the proposed MENA
box.
B. MENA Identity as Political Expression
“Middle East” and “North Africa” are sharply politicized terms. The
mere mention of these geographic destinations triggers images of war,
unchecked violence, anarchy and anti-Americanism.344 In addition, the
MENA region—as a conveniently constructed monolith—is bound
closely with the “Muslim World,” an imagined sphere characterized in
almost identical fashion.345 Thus, while the MENA classification is, in
its narrowest sense, a per se box that may appear on the 2020 U.S.

340. Lipton, supra note 336.
341. “‘The information is not in any way being used for law enforcement purposes,’ she said.
‘It’s being used to educate the traveler. We’re simply using basic demographic information to
help us communicate U.S. laws and regulations to the traveling public.’” Clemetson, supra note
335; see also EPIC Report, supra note 336.
342. Clemetson, supra note 335.
343. See Carrie Pixler, Setting the Boundaries of the Census Clause: Normative and Legal
Concerns Regarding the American Community Survey, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1097, 1124
(2010)
[The Deputy Director of the U.S. Census Bureau] also admitted concern about how
Homeland Security would use the data, but stated the Census Bureau did not maintain
the “authority to determine which organization gets which information. . . . The only
way we can guarantee that no one will ever be harmed by our information is to release
nothing . . . .”
Id. (quoting Clemetson, supra note 335).
344. Beydoun, supra note 97 at 168–71.
345. Id.
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census, it can be more expansively interpreted as a suspect classification
that binds those who check it to the embedded tropes and
misrepresentations attached to MENA identity.
Selecting a racial box on the U.S. census is far more than merely an
act of ethnic or racial identification—it is also political speech. Racial
identification is an express manifestation of membership within a staterecognized ethnic group or racial community. Thus, racial classification
is also a mode of political speech protected by the First Amendment.
This is especially true for Arab Americans, whose identity is acutely
politicized because of entrenched historical stereotypes and images
linked to turbulent events in the Arab World.
With the expansion of CVE programming, which “target[s] political
and religious speech,”346 an Arab American that checks off “MENA”
and identifies as “Arab” on the secondary box may be exposed to
enhanced surveillance. James Zogby, President of the Arab American
Institute, cautions, “[h]ow can you get people to comply when they
believe that by complying they put at risk their personal and family
security?”347 Indeed, opting to check MENA on the Census is, by and
large, an assumption of the de jure and de facto risks associated with
that identity.
Arab or MENA identity during the War on Terror may be interpreted
as a proxy for a specific political perspective or disposition. Therefore,
checking off MENA on the 2020 U.S. census, and then subsequently
filling in “Palestinian” or “Arab American” on the secondary box,348
may signal affiliation with a negative stereotype or feared entity.
Furthermore, although the Census Act does not directly ask applicants
about their religious affiliation,349 analysts examining demographic data
about Arab Americans will be able to determine the religious and
sectarian associations of individuals of interests based on a formula that
includes surname, nationality, residence in or proximity to a
concentrated community (i.e., Iraqi Shiite Americans in East Dearborn
and Detroit, Michigan), and even date of arrival to the United States.
C. A People Divided
Arab Americans are a people that trace their ancestry back to the
Arab World.350 A fluidly shifting social construction itself,351 Arab
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Akbar, supra note 13, at 828.
Clemetson, supra note 335, at 2330.
2015 Census Update, supra note 17, at 17.
13 U.S.C. § 221(c) (2012).
A heterogeneous population along lines of nationality, religion, phenotype, and political
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identity was divided along religious lines during the Naturalization Era.
The courts found Arab Christians to be white by law in 1915,352 while
Arab Muslims were not ruled to be white until 1944.353 The Mohriez
ruling commenced a seventy-one-year period of legal consensus
regarding the racial designation of Arab Americans as white, 354 which
will come to a close if the proposed MENA box is added to the 2020
U.S. census.
Even if the MENA box is adopted in 2020, a subset of Arab
Americans will continue to select the White box on the U.S. Census.
On the other hand, the benefits outlined in Part II.A will motivate others
to check the proposed MENA box. This Section examines the many
factors that shape competing and conflicting modalities of Arab
American racial identification, which is certain to continue even with
the per se reform and reclassification of Arab American identity.
1. Arab Americans as Per Se White
Closer surveying of MENA communities at large, and Arab
Americans in particular, reveals that certain elements within both are
opposed to reform and reclassification. In other words, many Arab
Americans are content—and embrace the benefits associated—with
being classified as white.355 Other segments of the Arab American
population have effectively assimilated into the broader white milieu,
disassociating and disconnecting themselves from Arab identity.356
These subsets of the general Arab American population, which tend to
perspective, Arab American identity is built upon a shared language, customs, and history.
Perhaps most saliently today, “the modern contours of Arab American identity” are based on
“Pan-Arabism”—a secular framing of Arab identity built upon the vision of a trans-national Arab
nation or community. See YOUSSEF M. CHOUEIRI, ARAB NATIONALISM: A HISTORY: NATION
AND STATE IN THE ARAB WORLD 82–92 (2000), for a comprehensive description of PanArabism, which establish the modern contours of Arab American identity.
351. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 2, at 7.
352. Dow v. United States, 226 F. 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1915) (holding reversed earlier decisions,
and ruled that Syrian Christians were white by law, and thus, could be naturalized as American
citizens).
353. Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941, 942 (D. Mass. 1944) (holding that Arab Muslim
immigrants could be naturalized as American citizens).
354. Id.
355. See generally Michelle Khalife, Not Quite White: The Diary of a Lebanese American, 1
CRITICAL STUD. J. 191, 193–95 (2008) (providing for a Lebanese American woman’s account of
the social and psychological benefits associated with seeking to pass as white).
356. See Tehranian, supra note 12, at 1222, where John Tehranian defines (racial)
“conversion” as “the act of trying to be something one is not.” Tehranian distinguishes
conversion from “passing,” a related act, whereby “one acknowledges one identity but
nevertheless attempts to hide that identity.” Id.
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oppose the proposed MENA box, will likely continue to identify as
white even after the box’s prospective adoption in the 2020 U.S. census.
Arab Americans that have multigenerational roots in the United
States and have attained a specific degree of assimilation may likely
continue to identify as white on the U.S. census.357 Sizeable segments
of the Syrian and Lebanese American communities—who comprised
the overwhelming majority of the initial immigrant waves in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—have comparatively attained
the greatest degree of assimilation within the broader Arab American
population.358
Therefore, older generation Arab Americans tend to favor identifying
as white,359 while recent immigrants favor minority or MENA identity.
“Whereas descendants of the first and second generations of Lebanese
and Syrian immigrants valued the ‘white’ status that their parents’ or
grandparents’ had fought for, the new immigrants were less likely to see
themselves as ‘white’.”360 This generational divide also intersects with
phenotypic, nationality, and religious difference. Older generation
immigrants who largely identify as white are overwhelmingly Levantine
and Christians,361 while subsequent and modern immigrant waves hail
from all over the Arab World and are primarily Muslims.362
Second, Arab American Christians that fear the possible conflation of
357. This assimilation is reflected in the relatively greater homeownership and median
household income rates for Syrian and Lebanese Americans, which far exceed the figures for
newer Arab American groups (such as Moroccan and Iraqi Americans) and even the national
averages. See ASI & BEAULIEU, supra note 79, at 3 (“The homeownership rate was 66.6% for the
nation, compared with 59.6% for Arab owner-occupied housing units. The homeownership rate
for Lebanese and Syrians was above the national level at 71.6% and 69.2%, respectively.”).
Economic upward mobility, for multi-generational Syrian and Lebanese Americans, has in part
strengthened identification as white. Id. at 5 (“The median household income for all households
in the United States in 2010 dollars was $51,914 . . . . Lebanese households had the highest
median income ($67,264) . . . .”). And very well, may motivate segments of these communities
to prefer the white designation over the proposed MENA box. Id. at 3–5.
358. NAFF, supra note 119, at 15.
359. Id. at 9. Here, Naff discusses how early Syrian immigrants, and their progeny, “willingly
acquiesced to Americanization and . . . to the benefits of becoming American.” Naff deploys
American as a proxy for white, both in terms of a culture and a race—the latter because the letter
of the law, until 1952, mandated whiteness as a prerequisite for naturalization. Thus, as argued
by John Tehranian, the per se requirement that an immigrant be ruled white also moved
immigrants to “perform whiteness,” both inside and outside of the courtroom. Tehranian, supra
note 63, at 817. “‘I’m not for it. . . . I feel I’m a Mayflower American,’ said Eide Alawan, a 74year-old son of a Syrian immigrant whose roots are mostly Arab.” U.S. Mulls Middle-East North
Africa Category for 2020 Census, supra note 176.
360. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1303.
361. NAFF, supra note 119, at 12.
362. Suleiman, supra note 1, at 1.
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the MENA box with Muslim identity, 363 an entrenched and pervasive
stereotype,364 may continue to check off White.365 Because of the
discursive association of the Middle East and North Africa with Islam,
MENA identity will be viewed as a proxy and placeholder for Muslim
American, which is linked to terror and radicalization suspicion.
Therefore, an aversion to being identified or linked to Muslim identity
has driven a segment of the Arab American Christian population to
oppose the MENA box.
Third, fear of pronounced surveillance and policing may motivate
many Arab Americans to continue to select the White box on the
census.366 Although many applicants may favor identifying as Arab
American and selecting the MENA box, this fear will spur many people
to identify against their existential inclination or preference, and in turn,
diminish the aggregate count of Arabs and MENAs on the 2020 U.S.
census.367 Thus, undercounting will be born out of chilled racial
identification, instead of the per se negation of Arab American identity
that presently exists. Or, stated simply, the conflation of MENA with
terrorism will persuade many Arab Americans to “hide under the white
race label,”368 and use the per se classification as a “covering”
device.369
Together, because of selective identification as white and the chilled
identification of MENA for fear of state surveillance and private
discrimination, a considerable percentage of the roughly 4 million Arab
Americans will remain within the white classification.370 The proposed
MENA category may even embolden the attachment to per se whiteness
by subsets of the Arab American population, who may already or
eventually informally disidentify as Arab American or seek (or
continue) to “pass” as white.371 Therefore, even if the MENA box is
363. Joshi, supra note 133, at 212. “[A] phenomenon wherein the fact of an individual’s race
creates a presumption as to her religious identity . . . whereby a specific religion becomes
identified by a direct or indirect reference to a real or imagined ethnic/racial characteristic.” Id. at
212, 216 (emphasis in original).
364. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
365. The number of Arab American Christians that check off White may be quite high, given
that 63% of Arab Americans today identify as Christian. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 40.
366. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1313.
367. If the proposed MENA box is in fact adopted in 2020.
368. Id.
369. Tehranian, supra note 12, at 1218, 1222.
370. The real population is expected to be larger in 2020. See AAI DEMOGRAPHICS, supra
note 78.
371. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002). Yoshino defines passing as
“[an attempt] to change or hide her identity” and the latter as strategic concealment of stigmatized
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adopted in 2020, a sizeable percentage of the broader Arab American
population will continue to check off the White box. Consequently,
while the MENA box may diminish undercounting, invisibility and
other associated concerns, its adoption will not entirely solve them—at
least, not in the short term.
2. Arab Americans as Per Se MENA
The existential, political, legal, and economic interests mobilizing
Arab American support for the MENA box indicates that a slanted
majority of the population will check the box if it is added to the 2020
census form. As outlined in Part II.A, these interests, jointly and
severally, would bring forth a range of immediate benefits. In addition,
the MENA box will also drive long-term gains in establishing a greater
foothold in almost every sphere of American life and society.
Therefore, for many Arab Americans driven by these interests, the
MENA box functions as a means toward claiming a range of benefits.
In addition to the pursuit of interests, the erosion of Arab American
civil liberties—particularly after 9/11—has “raised the ethnic
consciousness” of significant segments of the Arab American
population.372 This is particularly the case for Arab American Muslims,
who face increased stigmatization on religious and ethnic identity
grounds—especially after 9/11: “[t]he demonization of Islam and its
conflation with terrorism, in particular, has enhanced the sense of
minority status” among Arab American Muslims.373 While covering or
passing is more accessible to Arab American Christians,374 these hiding
devices are less accessible to Arab American Muslims, who are
discriminated along ethnic (Arab), religious (Muslim) and
“intersectional” lines.375 Certainly, Arab Americans who are also
Muslim are exposed to both racial and religious animus, particularly
those who conspicuously express their religion.
This experience is particularly true for Arab American Muslims who
outwardly express their religious identities, against “increased pressure
to perform a mainstream American identity.”376
Conspicuous
aspects of identity. Id. at 772, 780.
372. Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1300.
373. Beydoun, supra note 40.
374. Tehranian, supra note 12, at 1222.
375. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1282–83 (1991) (framing
“intersectionality” to highlight and illustrate the compounded discrimination endured by
individuals who belong to two or more marginalized groups).
376. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-
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expressions of religious identity—such as Muslim men who don the
beard,377 Muslim women who wear the hijab378 or entire households
that fast during the month of Ramadan—enhance the “likelihood that
one is imagined as a terrorist or terrorist sympathizer.”379 Anti-Muslim
bigotry and converging racial and religious animus targeting Arab
American Muslims380 have intensified their sense of marginalization,
and in turn, their consciousness and identification as “people of
color.”381 As a consequence of converging racial and religious animus,
Arab American Muslims are more likely than their Christian
counterparts to identify as racial minorities—and check off MENA—if
the box is adopted in 2020.
Arab American organizations, as discussed in Part II.A, are highly
invested in the implementation and preservation of a MENA box.
Therefore, leading Arab American groups, including AAI, ADC382 and
ACCESS,383 will continue to mobilize their constituents to check off
MENA, and, very likely, encourage them to fill in “Arab American” in
the secondary box.384 Greater identification along these lines enhances
access for these organizations to public and private halls of power,
foundation and government grants, the ears of politicians, and a rising
base of supporters duly counted by the census.
Thus, beyond merely supporting the adoption of the MENA box on
the 2020 census, Arab American organizations will continue to look to

RACIAL” AMERICA 168 (2013).
377. “For Muslim men . . . donning a beard demonstrates piety, and emulation of Islam’s final
and foremost messenger, Mohammed.” Khaled A. Beydoun, Islam Incarcerated: Religious
Accomodation of Muslim Prisoner before Holt v. Hobbs 1 (Feb. 7, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2561845.
378. Headscarf (Arabic).
379. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 376, at 168.
380. Crenshsaw, supra note 375, at 1282–83.
381. George Hunter & Mark Hicks, Police, Arab Group At Odds Over Kroger Attack, DET.
NEWS (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2015/02/20/
police-dispute-racial-motive-dearborn-supermarket-attack/23758641/ (following an attack on an
Arab man in a grocery store, the head of the ADC-Michigan chapter referred to the victim and
Arab Americans at large as “people of color”).
382. Press Release, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Action Alert: Support
the MENA Category on the U.S. Census (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.adc.org/2015/01/action-alertsupport-the-mena-category-on-the-u-s-census/.
383. ACCESS, the leading Arab American direct services organization in the United States,
considers Arab Americans a “community of color.” Kayyali, supra note 24, at 1300. In line with
this position, ACCESS’ leadership has long pursued minority status both locally and nationally.
Id.
384. 2015 Census Update, supra note 17, at 17.
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drum up their constituents’ numbers on subsequent censuses.385 In the
process, these organizations will seek to ensure that Arab American
demographical figures will continue to rise along actual immigration
trends and increased canvassing efforts to convince Arab Americans to
identify as MENA instead of white on the census. Organizational
muscle invested in mobilizing per se identification as MENA will,
presumptively, spur more and more community buy-in after its
prospective adoption, and subsequently, establish the category as a
permanent fixture on the U.S. census application. This organizational
commitment, even after adoption of the proposed MENA box, ensures
that Arab Americans will be counted—instead of undercounted—by the
census for better and for worse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Deemed white by law since 1944,386 the 2020 U.S. census may afford
Arab Americans with the unprecedented opportunity to identify as
MENA, and thus, nonwhite. This Article is the first scholarly
intervention examining this proposed reform, the converging
government interests spurring this moment of “racial progress,” and the
civil liberties concerns it raises for Arab Americans.
The Census Bureau currently classifies people from the MENA
region as white. However, the agency has proposed a standalone
MENA box for the decennial census of 2020.387 This proposed racial
category, if adopted, would provide Arab Americans with an
opportunity to identify as MENA and, in turn, nonwhite—a formal
designation that realigns with enhanced government surveillance and
promotion of local CVE policing of Arab, MENA, and Muslim
Americans. Policing of these communities will only grow more acute
with every domestic attack committed by an Arab or Muslim, which
oftentimes brings about collateral and collective guilt along perceived
religious and racial lines.388
385. The decades-long work of Arab American organizations, particularly AAI, ADC, and
ACCESS evidences continued support of the MENA box, even after its adoption.
386. Beydoun, supra note 6, at 66.
387. 2015 Census Update, supra note 17, at 17.
388. The most recent violent attack involving Muslim gunmen took place on December 2,
2015, in San Bernardino, California. Paloma Esquivel, Joseph Tanfani, Louis Sahagun & Sarah
Parvini, Obama: “This Was an Act of Terrorism Designed to Kill Innocent People,” L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-bernardino-terror-probe-widens
-as-obama-set-to-speak-20151206-story.html. The shootings, which involved two shooters who
were (at least nominally) Muslim, unfolded at Inland Regional Center, and left fourteen dead and
twenty-one injured. Id.
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While touted as a moment of racial progress, the timing of the
proposed 2020 census reform also raises many concerns. This Article
unveils the converging government interests in establishing a standalone
MENA box, which if implemented will: first, augment the precision of
government surveillance and monitoring programs; second, create a
formal binary for Arab Americans whereby voluntarily checking the
“MENA” box signals association with national security suspicion, while
checking “White” mitigates that suspicion; and third, divide Arab
Americans into two per se races.
These perils, weighed in conjunction with an enticing lot of
existential, political, legal, and economic interests, beg the question:
should Arab Americans check off on the proposed MENA box for the
2020 U.S. census? With less than five years before its prospective
adoption, should citizens and civil society actors continue to support the
proposed reclassification?
Forging ahead means enhancing
vulnerability to pronounced suspicion and surveillance, while opposing
the MENA box is tantamount to capitulating to the status quo—
precisely the present paradox that has perplexed Arab Americans for
nearly seventy-one years.
The benefits that will derive from the MENA box are plenty. But so
are the perils. If history is to repeat itself, the decision will not be one
reserved for Arab Americans to make, but rather a judgment to be
made, and handed down, by the State.

